Environmental values

Friday, August 24, 2007

"Domesticating Nature" — How vs. Why

In his comments on our "Domesticating Nature" post of August 17, 2007 (http://environmentalvalues.blogspot.com/2007/08/domesticating-nature-nyt-commentary.html)
Allen states that we have no choice but to be managers of everything. According to him, we should recognize this so that, at least, we don't manage "blindly". By that, I take Allen to mean "behaving with a blind eye to the consequences for the planet, for us, and perhaps even (thinking of Aristotle's comments on yesterday's post) how our activities reflect on our character and ability to live well". He justifies his suggestion for "conscious" management with a vision of the "inevitable".

Allen doesn't say what, exactly, is inevitable. Is he resigned to humans extending their direct influence to the remaining 17% of land (as of 1995)? Perhaps so. But it seem more likely that he is resigned to an irresistible and unstoppable human urge (as Kareiva, et. al. put it in their Science paper) to alter species and ecosystems to become "more useful" to us. A kind of unstoppable itch. That is what "domestication" is. Given that, Allen may be suggesting that, so long as we're in the business of domesticating the planet, we just need to make decisions that are better — more reasoned and more balanced — than the disastrous ones that we've made in the past.

But the problem is not that we've made horrible management decisions in the past and now we have to make better, more enlightened ones — perhaps ones engendered by better attitudes towards our environment. The problem is with the project of domestication itself. As Kareiva, et. al. suggest, the project is one in which we enumerate all the ecosystem services, then prioritize them or perhaps run a Benefit-Cost Analysis to select the ones that we really want to promote, them "impose" some management regime that selectively promotes these services.

To focus on the "management style" is to remove the focus from where it belongs — on the project itself.

For example, in the past, we didn't realize that our agricultural practices — which in the 35 years before 1998, increased N fertilization 7-fold, P fertilization 3.5-fold, a 1.7-fold increase in irrigated cropland — would lead to an enormous eutrophication of freshwater and marine ecosystems, which in turn led to the loss of native species, the invasion of alien species, simplifying shifts in food chains, and impairment of fisheries. And we didn't know that tropospheric redistribution of N and agricultural intensification would also eutrophy many terrestrial ecosystems, leading to the loss of N-efficient plants, the loss of critical soil nutrients such as Ca and K, and release greater amounts of N₂O — the most potent of the common greenhouse gases. (See, for example, Vitousek, P.M, Aber, J.D., Howarth, R.W., Likens, G.E., Matson, P.A., Schindler, D.W., Schlesinger, W.H., and Tilman , D.G., "Human Alteration of the Global Nitrogen Cycle: Sources and Consequences", Ecological Applications, 7:3 (1997), pp. 737-750, http://www.esajournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-abstract&issn=1051-0761&volume=007&issue=03&page=0737&ct=1. Also, Tilman, D., "Global environmental impacts of agricultural expansion: The need for sustainable and efficient practices", Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 96 (1999), pp. 5995-6000, http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/96/11/5995.)

Is the idea that, in the 21st century, we finally have come to know how to take all these factors into account? With modern ecology — as opposed to the flimsy and limited knowledge we had in the 1970's, 80's, and 90's — will we be able to select and promote just the right set of ecological characteristics that (this time) provide a comfortable, "humanized", and more comfortable home, literally custom made by us for us humans? Will we never again overlook some balance, some vulnerability, some interaction, some self-correcting feedback loop, some redundancy that's vital for an ecosystem's survival in infrequently encountered but inevitable times of stress? Will we never again have to read a paper by a group of world-renowned ecologists who have figured out, after the fact, why our management regime ended in disaster?

As in many matters, the key to a solution is asking the right question. We can ask with Kareiva, et. al., "How shall we manage our earth domestication project?" Admittedly, there may be better and worse ways to do this. As Allen suggests, perhaps a bit more humility would be better. But I take Klinkenborg's NYT commentary to suggest that, to focus on this question is to ignore the vital questions concerning our attitudes and behaviors towards our environment. Those questions don't ask how we should dominate our environment, but rather if we should. They don't ask us to consider whether we might live better by reigning in our intrusions and limiting our management as much as possible to the places that we have already seriously compromised. Perhaps, we would do even better to consider a retreat from our current, almost total domination.

After yesterday's interview, Aristotle said that he would like to ask, "Might we not flourish best by fundamentally caring for our home planet — not as the end result of a necessarily limited and self-serving project born from our limited imagination — but as the spectacularly, surprisingly, and dumbfoundingly complex place that, without any help from us, engendered and sustained our species — a species that now, with along with many others, make it home?"

Thursday, August 23, 2007

An Interview with Aristotle

(The first in a series)

Some of us are attracted to the idea of exploring how an ethics styled on Aristotle's theory of human virtue might help us understand the moral dimensions of our behavior as it relates to the broader, natural world that includes us. Aristotle's approach may circumvent some difficulties of other approaches; though it undoubtedly has difficulties of its own.

Helioskiagrablog wishes to make welcome those who are not hard-core philosophers and who may not have had the privilege of meeting at the Environmental Ethics Institute at the University of Montana. So we wish to devote this first in a series of posts on Aristotelian virtue ethics to a quick primer.

Portrait of Aristotle
(Anonymous,
Cathedral of Transfiguration,
Moscow)

To this end, we have spared no effort. Helioskiagrablog is extraordinarily fortunate to have with us today the all-time greatest expert on virtue ethics — Mr. Aristotle himself. That enormously renowned philosopher, we believe, is making his first ever appearance on a blog -- or at least, on a blog devoted to matters environmental and ethical. As you likely know, Mr. Aristotle is famous for his theory of everything. Helioskiagrablog is eager to see how we might apply that theory, and particularly, the ethical part, to "matters environmental and ethical".

So that we all can understand Mr. Aristotle, we have obtained (through dubious channels) a babelfish translator. Although not originally designed for dead languages, we managed some simple modifications that now enable it to work for ancient Greek.

H: Good day, Mr. Aristotle. We are enormously honored to have you here on helioskiagrablog.

A: Oh, you can just call me "Aristotle" for short; most of my friends do. Even Plato -- though I suppose that if he had seen my critique of his Republic, he might have had a few other choice words for me — "the Form of Horses**t", or something.

H: Very well, we'll just call you "Aristotle". That will help cut down on the typing.

A: Yes, well, I had my students do the writing for me. It helped them develop their intellectual virtues — the ones that have to do with theoretical reasoning, which are very important for human flourishing. The intellect is not just about practical thinking, you know. By the way, your blog's name is pretty amusing. Socrates would have liked it; he was always one for juxtaposing opposites. Come to think of it, I guess I like to do that, too — you know, all that stuff about excess, deficiency, and the mean in between. (Does that rhyme in translation, too?) But that's all about virtues of character, and I guess that's what you really want to talk about, right?

H: Right! Helioskiagrablog is pleased that you like its name. We are trying to cast some light into the shadows, you know.

A: (laughs) Very good. I flourished doing that, too.

H: Yes, we know. Ok, for those in our audience not familiar with your work...

A: Not familiar with my work? Can't anyone read ancient Greek anymore?

H: No..., yes..., well, not many of us. But we do have good translations, and here's one — of your best work on ethics: http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/artistotle.html. But let's help our audience with a Cliffs Notes version of your ethics...

A: Cliffs? Like the ones on three sides of the Acropolis?

H: Uh, well, no. What we meant was a kind of summary or synopsis that can guide your readers and ours.

A: Ok, that's pretty easy because my basic thinking on ethics is really quite simple. (If you want something hard, just pick up a copy of my "Metaphysics".) I hold that eudaimonia, or as you might say, "flourishing" or "living well" (thank you, babelfish) is the highest of human ends. We flourish by developing arête ("excellence" or "virtue") in our characteristic faculties, capacities, and functions. It's not that we attain a virtuous state and then we're done. Rather, it's a lifelong pursuit. To have a virtuous character is to continuously cultivate attitudes and habitual practices from which flow the excellence of our life's activities.

Humans have many capacities and functions in common with other creatures. But the ones that are uniquely human and most important for our flourishing are tied to our rationality. (Even Manny Kant, may he rest in peace, might agree with that.) So it is that we flourish most (achieve the highest good) when we use reason well to guide our activities in accordance with our continuously developing understanding of our unique capacities and what constitutes excellence in their actuation and exercise.

H: Perhaps an example would help?

A: Of course. I like to give the example of friendship, which is necessary for human flourishing. Here, we must distinguish friendships of virtue — "complete" friendships — from incomplete ones. To be an excellent friend, I must wish her well and do good for her; I must wish that my friend live and exist for her own sake, not mine; I must spend time with her; I must willingly and with unencumbered spirit make many of the same choices as her; I must share her distress as well as her joys. But if my friendship is based only on considerations of what I can get out of my friend and how much I must give for it; or merely on the pleasure of enjoying her wit or company — then it is contingent on feelings and circumstances that are changeable, not likely to endure, and so not complete. A friendship based only on utility and pleasure is not excellent; and I do not live as well if I "practice" my friendship in this way.

H: Gee, even I can understand that. So, can you just give us a hint about how your theory might apply to human behavior as it relates to the environment in which humans live?

A: Sure. It's easy to say in a general sort of way how my theory might apply. We need only look at the flourishing that might accrue to those who embody the virtue of caring for ecological communities. We are members of these natural communities in the sense that we are among their myriad and complexly interdependent parts. Perhaps this is much the same as our membership in human communities that are framed by interdependent social structures and institutions. Insofar as that is true, we flourish only if we are good ecological citizens. A bad citizen simply cannot flourish.

More than that, cultivating our characteristically human rational capacities to study, understand, and appreciate an ecological system as a complexly adaptive system whose flourishing is interdependent with ours, is to fulfill the highest of human functions. This would seem to have significant implications for choosing the attitudes and behaviors towards natural systems that we ought to cultivate. It might imply that we should develop our capacities for feeling, choosing, and acting well as individuals of a species on its one and only home planet. These attitudes and behaviors would be constitutive of an ecological excellence that stands alongside of the other excellences that I describe in my Nichomachean Ethics, such as caring for friends. In an important way, this is no different from cultivating eunoia, or "good will" by which one loves or likes another person for the sake of that other person — not as a source for self-advantage.

H: Wow; that's deep, dude. We hope that gives you some idea of how Aristotle, the man with the theory of everything, might approach environmental ethics.

A: Hey, before we break, what does it mean that "Aristotle was a bugger for the bottle"?

H: Where on earth did you hear that?

A: Hey, if it's about philosophy, I know about it. And a "Flying Circus"? Is that anything like a gryphon?

H: I think that we'll take those questions offline. We'll be back for more of Aristotle on helioskiagrablog shortly.

Sunday, August 19, 2007

A Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Bill of Rights ... and beyond

Let's do a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of the Bill of Rights.

There's a cost to every clause that triggers our litigious proclivities. Courts are clogged. Courthouses are built. Judges are hired. Lawyers absorb fantastic legal fees that could otherwise be spent on the social good. Not to speak of the enormous usurpation of human time.

Maybe the cost of one or another, or even a whole bunch of those clauses cannot be justified by the benefit of the freedoms they protect. Maybe, when you look hard, there's a lot of confusion-generating redundancy that enables lawyers to spend even more precious time and money. Maybe the Due Process Clauses in the 14th and 5th Amendments overlap or are completely redundant. James Madison, though persuaded to draft the Bill, thought that the entire thing was unnecessary in a government of enumerated powers. With a strained national budget and the national debt increasing at a staggering pace, we need to ensure that we're doing this constitutional business right. That is, we need to do it efficiently.

There's no real obstacle. Contingent evaluation studies have shown us that a person's life is worth around $6 million — at least a rich person's life. It's admittedly a bit awkward that those studies determine a poor person's worth at a small fraction of a rich person's. By comparison, monetizing those Bill of Rights freedoms should be a trivial exercise and considerably less awkward.

Does this suggestion seem strange to you? Does it seem strange to consider trying to identify words and phrases and clauses to elide in a framework that has somehow managed to adapt and to sustain the social organization of a diverse country/system for over two hundred years? Is it, perhaps a bit risky to think that we could really understand what social reorganizations our prospective streamlining would bring? Might some of the changes be irreversible because the new social structure no longer permits restoration of the old constitution?

Ok, so perhaps a BCA of the Bill of Rights is not a good idea. Let's do something easier.

Let's just decide how to make the most efficient use of the biophysical underpinnings of life on the planet. When species seem redundant and some are not as useful as others or maybe serve no perceptible use, we should let the less useful ones go extinct. What possible loss could there be from this loss of genetic information? When a piece of land is not being used to its fullest productive capacity, and when there's still some measurably excess capacity to absorb insults (aka waste), let's insult it and increase our production. What reason do we have not to run the biophysical world at its productive maximum?

This is, after all, sound modern resource management. This is a good idea. Isn't it?

Saturday, August 18, 2007

The Precautionary Principle — Key to Sustainability?

Bryan Norton, a luminary thinker about environmental ethics in general and about sustainability in particular says with Anne Steinemann that, to avoid a vacuous notion of sustainability, we need:

a set of principles, derivable from a core idea of sustainability, but sufficiently specific to provide significant guidance in day to day decisions and in policy choices affecting the environment. (Norton, B.G, Steinemann, A.C. "Environmental Values and Adaptive Management", Environmental Values 10 (2001), pp. 473-506)

According to Norton and Steinemann, chief among the guiding principles for sustainability is the Precautionary Principle. This is not an isolated perception. For example, Australia's "National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development" (1992) adopts the Precautionary Principle as a guiding principle.

Much needs to be said about what "sustainability" is. More needs to be said about whether or not "sustainable development" is an oxymoron. Those topics provide fertile material for future posts. This one restricts its attention to the Precautionary Principle.

What is it? According to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992):

Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.

The Precautionary Principle puts a conservative stake in the ground: It says that the uncertainty of even our best (often scientific) understanding is not an acceptable reason to avoid acting on threats to ecological systems — and by extension, to human health and well-being. It challenges the primacy of growth-promoting economic reasoning whereby the earth's resources are strictly economic "inputs" or absorbers of economic "output" waste. The Precautionary Principle is a principle of damage prevention.

But it is also fundamentally something reactive — a hastily constructed prop to hold up a barrier for a last stand when a threat of ominous proportions is immanent. For example, the oft-touted Montreal Protocol for phasing out ozone-depleting substances was adopted before the ozone "hole" science was conclusive. It dictated that then-known ozone-depleting chemicals be phased out. Yet it had, and still has nothing to say about any new chemical that may deplete stratospheric ozone. It is left to the vigilant to demonstrate the potential for a new substance's harm. Only then will it be included in the banned list. Only when the damage is palpable, only when its possibility presses down on our collective conscience — only then do we invoke the Precautionary Principle.

Is this enough for sustainability? Is the Precautionary Principle even the most central principle involved? An answer to that question cannot ignore what the principle fails to do:

The Precautionary Principle fails to provide any guidance for human behavior that directly interacts with the enveloping environment — even when the environment is considered merely as a set of "resources" for development. It fails to provide any practical wisdom for metering and moderating our actions to ensure the flourishing of ecological systems — even considered solely as a requirement for human flourishing (in the broad, Aristotelian sense of eudaimonia). It fails to make plain a set of human values that take into account the nature of complex adaptive systems — the limited nature of their ability to absorb insulting perturbations without flipping into simpler, degraded systems.

Perhaps most importantly, the Precautionary Principle fails to take into account our relationships with our surroundings as an extraordinarily important context for living our lives. This very important notion is spelled out in greater detail in Chapter 11 of a new book on "Environmental Values" by John O'Neill, Alan Holland, and Andrew Light (London: Routledge, 2007):
http://www.routledge.com/shopping_cart/products/product_detail.asp?sku=&isbn=9780415145091&parent
id=&pc=/shopping_cart/products/product_detail.asp?sku%3D%26isbn%3D9780415145084%26pc%3D

Friday, August 17, 2007

"Domesticating Nature" — NYT commentary

Earlier this week (on August 13, 2007), The New York Times ran an editorial comment on "The 17 Percent Problem and the Perils of Domestication" by Verlyn Klinkenborg:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/opinion/13mon4.html

Klinkenborg's piece is a commentary on the "Science" paper that Allen Thompson
(http://people.clemson.edu/~athomp6/web/home.html and
http://poe1860.blogspot.com/) posted to the BIBLIOGRAPHY for the 2007 Environmental Ethics course at the University of Montana:

http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/316/5833/1866/

As part of his conclusion, Klinkenborg says:

Humans are competent to do many things. But I do not think we are competent to run a global ecosystem. Something has been irretrievably lost by the time we begin to believe that we can manage nature for people. The essence of nature is that it is not “for people.”

I would add to Klinkenborg's comments that, in conceiving of ourselves as the earth's übermanagers, we apply the the necessarily restricted and relatively barren viewpoint of one, recently arrived species. In doing so, we lose a significant part of the humility and humanity that does make us special.

Thursday, August 16, 2007

EE break —> off to the Land of Oz

I've just returned from an intense week of doing Environmental Ethics at the University of Montana Environmental Ethics Institute (http://www.umt.edu/ethics/). This topped off an equally intense month of online discussion with an immensely talented, diverse, and warm-hearted group of people that included professors and students of philosophy, education and resource management, a bioremediation entrepreneur, an environmental, lawyer, and a Ph.D. ecologist.

Then there was me — defying categorization.

I'm taking an involuntary break from the world of EE -- that's Environmental Ethics, not Electrical Engineering -- trying to catch up with my paying job at Stanford and getting ready for a trip Down Under to a bioinformatics conference. I've managed to hook up with what looks like a quite wonderful wildlife tour that goes out of the conference city of Brisbane after the meeting:

http://www.learnaboutwildlife.com/index.htm

The proprietor (Dr. Ronda Green) reports that she's a research ecologist who is now planning to study philosophy. Go figure.

I still have 5 days free after that tour. Please give me suggestions for making good use of them!

Stanford posts the fall course offerings next Monday. When that happens, I'll be able to figure out whether or not I can take Peter Vitousek's Intro Ecology course. Last year's offering was at a time that would work for me. So I'm pretty hopeful. I feel that I really need some of that science — at least on a basic level — to understand something of what experts such the ecologist in the UM EE course and Dr. Green have to say. These people are in the vanguard of those who have figured out that narrow thinking in the traditional disciplines cannot begin to address the environmental problems that face us.

It's very, very fun and rewarding for me to be in "sponge mode" once again.

I promise to stay in touch, though there will likely be some lapse September 1-17 when I'm in the land of Oz.