Putting Moral Considerability in its Proper Place:

A quark-inspired exercise in metaethics

Acronyms:

MC	Moral Considerability or Morally Considerable (depending on context)
MCE	MC Entity – where "Entity" means "that to which MC is attributed", sans ontological prejudice
QDC	Quantum Chromodynamics – the part of the “standard model” of particle physics that concerns the “strong force”

What entities in the world should moral agents take into moral account in their moral considerations? This is the question of what is morally considerable. It is central to ethics.

Moral Force Fields: Composition VIII (Wassily Kandinsky)

Environmental ethics particularly has spotlighted the question as a key to expanding moral considerations beyond the realm of interhuman relationships, into the realm of the nonhuman, natural world. Most environmental ethicists have proposed that moral agents owe moral consideration to nonhuman animals. And some have gone well beyond nonhuman animals to include a broad spectrum of nonhuman elements – living (plants) and nonliving (mountains, deserts, and rivers), individuals and collectives (species and ecosystems).

I'd like to gaze out into the metaethical landscape to see where we might find Moral Considerability roaming the metaethical plains and how it relates to other basic notions that frame moral valuations.

My central (and perhaps not too stunning) suggestion is that that there are both more useful ways of thinking of MC; and less useful ways. One way is the way of those whom I shall call "MC foundationalists". They conceive of MC as the foundational anchor or starting point for moral evaluation. I would suggest that his may not be the most fruitful way to go about moral theorizing and moral evaluation. Motivating this criticism is a kind of dilemma endemic to this approach.

The dilemma comes from the struggle to account for the MC, or lack thereof, of rapists, sadists, and tyrants. MC foundationalists typically want to claim that interests always and without exception generate duties and thereby, MC. So it must be for tyrants who, after all, have interests. The trick, say MC foundationalists, is to recognize that for tyrants, the duties are prima facie ones generated by prima facie interests. How can interests be prima facie? According to them, interests can be overridden or defeated. For example, to say that an entity's interests are defeated (according to a representative account) is to say that they are given "no moral weight". So presumably, an entity whose case for moral considerability hinges entirely on prima facie interests that generate merely prima facie duties is only prima facie MC.

But hold on! It appears that we have a theory according to which interests that have no moral weight – that is, that do not count morally (as the MC foundationalist defines "defeatable") – nonetheless confer MC on a moral subject – albeit a special, ethereal kind of MC that we call "prima facie MC". (I would claim that the notion of "overridden" is as problematic as that of “defeatable”. But I omit the argument for that here.)

This is far too ethereal for my materially and biologically limited mind to grasp. More to my point, it is not very useful – at least for me – in promoting an understanding what makes an entity MC. What path would lead to such an awkward theory?

To find out, let's try some deconstructive meta-metaethics.

To be fair, I think that there are more and less sophisticated versions of MC foundationalism. Relatively simple versions are propounded by such theorists as Robin Attfield (a consequentialist) and Paul Taylor (a deontologist). These are justifiably criticized in O’Neill, J., Holland, A., and Light, A, Environmental Ethics, Routledge, 2008, Chapter 6. But I'd like to start with Attfield and Taylor, then visit a couple of more sophisticated versions of MC foundationalism, and then finally suggest a rather different, non-foundational place for MC in the metaethical landscape – one that happens to fit quite naturally into virtue ethics.

MC for Attfield and Taylor – monistic MC (the QCD model)

For Attfield, Taylor, and many other utilitarian and deontologically minded theorists, MC is the foundational anchor of their theory and a starting point for moral evaluation. "Starting with MC" means identifying, individuating, and locating the MCE's that figure in moral valuations. Doing this requires a definition. And the definition is standardly conceived as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Attfield and Taylor keep it simple – with just one (necessary and sufficient) condition. According to them, an entity is morally considerable just in case it is living.

So the primary and first task of a moral theorizer or moral agent is to go out into the normatively laden world, MC definition in hand as a kind of Sibley's Field Guide to MC, and apply it to make correct MC identifications. That gladiola is living, so it’s MC. That rock … not... And so on.

What kind of moral landscape does this exercise yield? It’s undoubtedly a landscape dotted with MCE's! Each MCE is a point source of moral force that acts on any moral agent that happens (morally) nearby. A MCE thereby constitutes a point locus of moral concern for that agent. Entities without MC exert no moral force on moral agents.

The ontology is dumbfoundingly simple. We have an MCE. We have an agent. We have the moral force that the MCE exerts on the agent; and we have the agent's reciprocal moral concern for the MCE (perhaps a duty or obligation). The force does not change – in strength, range, or quality – for different MCE's or for different agents.

I call this the "quantum chromodynamic (QCD) theory of moral considerability". That is because an alien (such as myself) might be struck by how closely this theory of the moral force of MCE's resembles the quantum chromodynamic theory of the "color force" between color-charged quarks (and quark-composed entities). In quantum chromodynamics, an entity under examination may be a proton or a neutron or some other baryon, or some more exotic thing such as a meson, or even a pentaquark. The entity may have many different properties – for example, spin, angular momentum, flavor, mass, and charge. But just one property of an entity – the color charge of the quarks that comprise it – enables that entity to exert its color force. Amazingly, the strength of this force is fixed. As is its range. (It is not governed by the inverse square law.) At one time we knew of only three kinds of quarks. Particle physicists have since expanded that set (to six) – just as MC theorists such as Attfield and Taylor have expanded the set of MCE's beyond the usual, human suspects.

The key point to notice is that one MCE – a point source of moral force – is indistinguishable from the next. Each MCE qualifies, and each one qualifies according to one and the same qualifying definition. The definition confers one and the same MC property on each qualifying entity. And each such entity according exerts one and the same moral force on any (interchangeable) moral agent in the vicinity. That’s it!

O'Neill et. al. are justifiably critical of this picture of the metaethical landscape. At the very least, it leads straight to big-time trouble in accounting for the differences in the values that we confer on MCE's whose MC is theoretically identical. (O’Neill, et. al. recount (pp. 103-104) the gyrations of Attfield and Taylor to make the appropriate fine adjustments.) Part of the problem, O'Neill et. al. say, lies in the monistic nature of MC in such theories. They correctly point out that moral considerability is too complex and nuanced a notion for it to be conferred by a single condition. Surely, there must be a plurality of qualifying conditions.

A pluralistic definition of MC

So, an MC foundationalist who is either a consequentialist or a deontologist might respond, "You want a plurality? I’ll give you a plurality. And I don't need no stinkin' virtue ethics for that!"

Of course that is absolutely correct! The MC foundationalist might therefore propose a definition of MC that has lots of clauses – and particularly, not just sufficient conditions that expand the set of qualifying entities in ever-widening concentric circles, but ones that capture interesting pockets of MC in the moral world not captured by any other condition.

But notice that merely adding a multiplicity of qualifying clauses in the definition does not avoid the initial criticism of O'Neill et. al. The multiplicity of clauses makes the definition bigger. It makes it more complex. It might include conditions that don't merely expand the set of qualifying entities in ever-widening concentric circles. But using such a definition does not, in itself, change the metaethical landscape, which still comprises undifferentiated MCE's exerting undifferentiated MC forces on undifferentiated moral agents – a landscape that requires awkwardly contrived and unconvincing adjustments to account for the differences in MC that we all acknowledge.

In short, our simple-minded QCD model of the metaethical landscape has not fundamentally changed ... yet. Though suffused with a pluralism of qualifying conditions, it is still stuck with a monism of MCE's. We just have a fancier criterion for identifying each MCE/quark in it.

Pluralistic MC (the "standard model")

What the MC foundationalist may really yearn for is not just a bigger, more complex, more nuanced, non-concentric, multi-conditional (pluralistic) definition of MC. Rather, or additionally, she may want to change the model in two significant ways – by:

1. Differentiating the MCE's on the basis of their qualifying conditions.
2. Differentiating the moral forces that such differentiated MCE's exert.

(We note in passing that moral agents are still left as undifferentiated and indistinguishable loci on which moral forces impinge.)

These changes change our metaethical landscape dramatically. It is now populated, not by a plethora of indistinguishable MCE's, but by recognizably different kinds of MCE's exerting recognizably different kinds of moral forces of varying strengths on moral agents. If one qualifying condition for MC is sentience (as it is on most environmental ethics accounts), then an entity possessing it is the kind of MCE that exerts a sentience-flavored moral force on a nearby moral agent. If an entity possesses autonomy , then it radiates an autonomy-flavored moral force. And, of course, one and the same entity can possess more than one qualifying attribute. In that case, it emanates a multiplicity of vector forces – one vector emanating from each MC-qualifying property – that impinge on any moral agent.

This move turns our QCD theory of MC into a full-fledged "Standard Model" of MC in one quantum leap (so to speak). The Standard Model of particle physics subsumes QCD. An entity may still have color, making it a point source for strong interactions – just as QCD describes. But it may also have other properties that enable it to exert other kinds of force – spin (actually, helicity) for weak interactions, charge for electromagnetic forces, and mass for gravitational forces. The full Standard Model also expands the set of qualifying (force-emanating) entities – for example, to include leptons (such as electrons), which (unlike quarks and the entities such as protons and neutrons that they comprise) have a weak force but no strong (color) force.

So why shouldn't we be satisfied with this suitably enriched, metaethical landscape with a pluralism of MCE's? The hint comes from our starting point. Let’s recall the MC foundationalist’s unsatisfying struggle to account for moral forces that really don't have any moral significance – as if there were certain kinds of shields that deflected moral forces back to their villainous originators. Great science fiction. Unsatisfying ethical theory. A truly pluralistic notion of MC (such as the one just described) does nothing to solve the problem of accounting for the MC of rapists, sadists, and tyrants.

Virtue ethics – pluralistic MC in a nonstandard model

How else can we locate MC on the metaethical landscape? Where else could we place MCE’s? In this brief note, I'd like to offer just one seminal suggestion. It's a suggestion that fits happily into at least some forms of virtue ethics, but perhaps not quite so happily into consequentialist or deontological approaches.

The suggestion is:

Don’t start from MC and MCE's as moral theoretical primitives.

It simply is less useful to anchor moral theory – as well as moral reflection and valuation – with these point sources of moral force. Populating the moral landscape with conceptually detachable and detached MCE's (even with a plurality of types) on the one hand, and then throwing in a bunch of similarly detachable and detached moral agents on the other is something that leads to the awkward epicycles to connect them and mysterious force shields to disconnect them. (I'm reminded of the noble, but awkward and ultimately unsatisfying attempts of rationalists to connect disembodied rational souls with the material bodies that those souls inhabit.)

In contrast, virtue ethics (as I would propose it) starts, not with MC, but with virtues. It starts by identifying virtues and by justifying them. The general nature of MC logically derives from the general nature of a virtue. Specific kinds of MC derive from specific properties of and justifications for specific virtues. We have this definition:

An entity is MC just in case, for some justified virtue, a virtuous agent who possesses that virtue responds to that entity by acting and reacting in ways that are appropriate for expressing that virtue in the presence of that entity.

This is a very broad and unifying conception of MC that logically precludes its detachment from moral agents. It also precludes detachment of a MCE from its contextualized role in moral evaluation relative to virtues. A MCE is an entity that is the basis of a virtuous response. The form of that response is one that is an appropriate one for that particular basis for responding.

We conclude with some salient features of this conception of MC – including features that distinguish it from any "Standard Model" – and that (we submit) help to avoid the theoretical epicycles of MC foundationalism:

1. MC is not taken to be the foundational anchor of ethical theory. Rather, the MC of something derives from a virtue or more generally, a multiplicity of virtues that are justified separately and logically prior to anointing something “MC”. A virtue of active benevolence such as helpfulness is justified for its ability to serve the ends of social cooperation and helping others realize their potential to lead a meaningful life. So far as that justification goes, it says nothing about what person or what kind of person in what circumstances might be MC for that virtue. Which leads to the next point...
   
   
2. By definition, MC is contextually dependent on a virtue (or set of virtues). It also depends on the circumstances that are critical factors in determining whether or not something might be an appropriate basis for the response of a person with those virtues. From the characterization of a (previously justified) virtue such as helpfulness, it is clear that not every person under any circumstance is a basis for the response of an agent who is virtuous in that way. As a consequence, not every person is MC with respect to this virtue under at least some circumstances. Most young children in most circumstances are bases of responsiveness for helpfulness. But not sadists, rapists, or tyrants. We return to this in our final point.
   
   
3. The virtue-relative conception of MC is a very broad and thereby unifying one, despite the fact that it does derive from virtue. It is far broader than a typical MC foundationalist account, according to which an MC entity must have its own interests. On a (or my) virtue ethics account, having interests is not a requirement. Of course, an entity could have interests. And these interests could make the entity MC. If so, that would be because an entity with interests may be the basis of responsiveness for a particular virtue – for example a virtue of "respect for nature".
   
   But we must take care to avoid a possible confusion about this. "Having interests" – the interests of a living thing or (if some might claim) a collective such as a species or ecosystem – may serve two quite different metaethical roles. On the one hand, it may be an end that justifies one or more virtues. On the other hand, it may be the basis of responsiveness for some virtue that is a disposition to promote those very interests. But these two things are logically distinct and as a matter of fact, are distinct for many virtues – even virtues whose basis of responsiveness are (or include) entities with their own interests. For example, the bases of responsiveness of a virtue of communion with nature are typically natural objects and environments. But (I would say) the ends served by this virtue are those of the moral agent – namely, her ability to enjoy and take advantage of natural delights on their own terms.
   
   The point here is that, in this virtue ethics conception, MC is a broad and unifying concept not confined to entities with interests. Objects, collectives, properties, events of various sorts can all be MC as the basis for a virtuous response.
   
   
4. It does not require that an MC object without interests have intrinsic value (in the sense of "non-instrumental value"). What must have intrinsic (non-instrumental) value is the end served by the virtue, whose basis of responsiveness is (by definition) MC. This lightens the burden of trying to sort out (as do those wedded to MC foundationalism) the duality presented by things that are MC versus things that have intrinsic value.
   
   
5. It embraces a plurality of kinds of MC. This is the almost-too-obvious consequence of the plurality of virtues, the plurality of ends that the various virtues serve (and that justify them), and the plurality of entities that are the bases for a virtuous moral agent's response. For example, benevolence (or an agent who is benevolent) may respond to other agents by promoting their capabilities. On the other hand, a nonmalifecent agent may focus on nonhuman natural goods on which others depend for their well-being, and the need to act so as not to compromise those goods.
   
   
6. It embraces the possibility that any entity may embody multiple kinds of MC. This is a straightforward consequence of the fact that one entity may be the basis of responsiveness for multiple virtues. Thus, an entity may be acted upon out of benevolence, out of respect for autonomy, and so on.
   
   
7. Finally, it avoids theoretical epicycles and mysterious moral force shields of the sort that haunt MC foundationalism and that launched our discussion. There is no need to speak of prima facie duties to a sadist, rapist, or tyrant based on prima facie interests that have no moral weight and so only confer merely prima facie MC. Nothing needs to be overridden. Nothing needs to be "defeated". Instead, we recognize that such virtues as passive benevolence (e.g. nonmaleficence) and active benevolence (e.g. helpfulness) are justified as serving certain ends. For example, they might serve social cooperation or eudaimonistic ends such as giving children the opportunity develop and realize the best in themselves. As such, sadists, rapists, and tyrants are typically not proper bases for a benevolent person's response. These kinds of people are not, at least with respect to this kind of virtue, MC.

Addendum: Through Thick and Thin: Consequentialism versus Virtue Ethics

O'Neill's, et. al. seem to claim that only virtue ethics can capture the nuance and complexity of the moral landscape and the place of MC in it. I do not subscribe to that position. But my position is also rather different from (and may not be welcomed by) those MC foundationalists who merely replace a QCD model of MC with a Standard Model of MC.

As Dale Jameison has observed (in “Why Utilitarians Should be Virtue Theorists”), utilitarianism is a kind of ethical Turing Machine. But I'm not thinking of Jamieson's advocacy of the "local appropriation" of virtue within a broader, more standard act utilitarian framework. Rather, it seems to me highly plausible that some form of rule consequentialism might be formulated so as to emulate virtue ethics. That is because the rules in such a rule utilitarianism, like the virtues in a virtue ethics, are justified logically prior to, and separate from actions. In the sort of rule utilitarianism I have in mind, actions would be evaluated with reference to the rules. This is rather different from the standard (and I believe Jamieson's) utilitarian conception of virtue as "dispositions, the possession of which maximize utility".

But while a properly formulated rule utilitarianism may turn out to "emulate" a properly formulated virtue ethics, its theoretical foundations may look quite different. That is because the logic of justifying rules in a consequentialist framework may differ substantially from the logic of justifying character traits in a virtue ethics framework. This may call into question whether, in the absence of the emulation goal, an honest working out of rule utilitarianism would, in fact, yield the emulation result.