Friday, May 9, 2008

The Toontown guide to natural value

Or: Suspending the laws of ecological science

0 Introduction: Good values, good science, and the Natural Capital Project

Toontown: Still from the 1988 movie
Who Framed Roger Rabbit
Toontown, in the movie "Who Framed Roger Rabbit", is a place that is free of the laws of physics and where the principles of decent behavior are ignored. It is a place where Toons thrive. But it is an ominous and dangerous place for real people.

The "Natural Capital Project" – the working out of nature's economic value – is a place that is free from the laws of real ecological science. It is also a place that suspends basic principles of justice and other fundamental requirements for any acceptable theory of value. It is a place in which the usual beneficiaries of economic valuation thrive. But is ominous and dangerous to real natural systems, and ultimately, to people, too.

It is a matter of grave concern that many fine scientists, motivated by the urge to save nature, have joined the rush to the Natural Capital Project. In fact, its most public and distinguished proponents are extremely talented scientists. These people, most of whom have a deep respect for nature and wish to halt its accelerating destruction, are unable to resist the allure of natural capitalism, which derives from the power of "bottom line" reasoning to influence and justify policy. On first encounter, I also found it exciting, even revelatory.

But the proponents of natural capitalism, like myself at first, may not have considered, or may not be equipped to consider whether this project really makes sense as a legitimate value proposition. Whether it makes sense as a legitimate theory of natural value. Whether it make moral sense. Whether we could really live with what it implies. Whether it even makes scientific sense.

Scientific sense. Good scientists are greatly concerned that their science be represented correctly to inform social deliberation. There have been too many recent cases of the intentional warping of science to suit preconceived political ends. I will argue that it is a distorted or cartoon version of science that supports natural capitalism. I don't think that the scientific community that supports natural capitalism realizes how that support subverts the real science that they hold dear.

At bottom, the Natural Capital Project is an hypothesis or claim about natural value. Of course, it is not entirely, or even mostly, an empirical claim. But I think that in one important sense familiar to scientists, it should be regarded as would a scientific hypothesis or claim – as something that merits the most vigorous and rigorous scrutiny.

There's a lot at stake. Nature is being destroyed at an almost incomprehensible pace. Many of our monetary and intellectual resources to try to slow, stop, or reverse the destruction are invested in the Natural Capital Project. Surely, we would not wish for that project to be a path that not only fails to slow the devastation, but actually accelerates and even guarantees it. That, I believe, is the direction where natural capitalism leads.

I am here concerned with assumptions and presuppositions that are rarely, if ever, thoughtfully discussed in the scientific and economic literature. The issues of value and good science are complex and merit some extended discussion. Here are major signposts to help the reader navigate it:

1) Why economic value is completely inappropriate as a general theory of value.
2) A socio-psychological speculation on the striking paradox that economic reasoning is embraced as a way to preserve nature despite the fact that it has been the principal driving force behind its devastation.
3) The role of science and scientists in the economic valuation of nature.
4) The dangers of playing this role.
5) A brief digression describing the very different (and, I think, irrelevant) problem set that economists define for themselves.
6) How the "science" that scientists present to describe units of natural economic value is a cartoon version of the real science that they do.
7) Chess value: An analogy for natural capital.
8) A postscript: How to see through some transparently bad defenses of natural capitalism.

1 Economics and a cartoon theory of value

Economics is evaluation based on unvarnished, unchallenged human self-interest. Not just any kind of self-interest. Rather, it is specifically the kind of self-interest that we express in the marketplace by giving up something we prefer less (often, part of our paycheck) for something we prefer more (a thing we like). The universe of economic value is the universe of value-in-trade, which projects the subjective preferences of the traders, each trying to gain her own marketplace advantage.

It is startling, or it should be startling, that economists speak of this kind of value as "human welfare". But in the world of economics, "human welfare" is just another term for "economic value". Economic value is realized by acquiring as much as possible of what we think we want. Omitted is any consideration of whether or not that really does result in well-being. Or a good life. Or whether it properly considers the rights and interests of other persons. (Which some would say is part of living the good life.) Everyone is expected to look after her own rights and interests. And to satisfy them to as great a degree as possible. Independent of the consequences for others – which the economic calculus is prepared to include in its cumulative calculations.

Some players in the market game have nothing or almost nothing to give up for trade. They are therefore willing to take almost anything from those of greater means with a lot to gain in a trade. But the perfectness of a "perfect" market transaction has nothing to do with fairness.

That this may be acceptable value framework even in the marketplace is not, or should not be a foregone conclusion. But economists go further – much further. Perhaps duped by their own, ill-considered use of the term "human welfare" (scare quotes mandatory), or perhaps over-impressed with their virtuosic facility in computing economic value, they carry their notion of value well outside the domain of the marketplace. They boldly present the concept of economic value as a general theory of value. Or at least, the theory of value to use in public discourse. Often, its most flagrant failing – its radical subjectivity (the third of economic valuation's four problems discussed below) – is flaunted to justify its use in the public domain. In this context, economists relabel the radical subjectivity of their moral universe as "moral neutrality".

It is painfully obvious that the economic conception of value is a non-starter for a general theory of value. It seems absurd to think that a market-based conception of human interactions could ground a theory of moral value, a theory of the good life, or a theory that accounts for normative standards in human relationships – both inter-human relationships and relationships with non-human nature. But exactly that thinking – that economic value is a viable conception of general value – has a stranglehold on the public imagination. It is ensconced in our political institutions. It has even taken hold in many if not most organizations that profess environmental advocacy. And it is the basis for natural capitalism.

Perhaps this is "just" thinking as though economic value is all the value there is. But we base some of our most critical decisions on the equivalence of value (unqualified) and economic value. These are decisions that, for example, determine who and how many people are to die from toxic pollution. They are undeniably laden with implications for morality and justice. So in practice "just" thinking as though value = economic value is no different from thinking that they are substantively equivalent.

The purchase of economic evaluative thinking on the public mind – and more to the point of this essay – on scientists is real and tenacious. So before proceeding, we would do well to briefly consider (just) four in a long list of crippling problems with this premise.

First, the economic conception of value is extraordinarily narrow. To make the value of every thing the value of that thing considered as a commodity in a market transaction is to grotesqely truncate the value of things. (The use of the term "commodity" is not uniform. We here use it in the general sense of a relatively homogeneous "good" that can be a resource or a service. The homogeneity is sufficient to make interchangeable all goods of a kind.) It is doubtful that this conception of value would serve even for commodities, let along for other persons, social standards of conduct, or for nature. The old, beat-up, Sears Craftsman hammer that my father gave me as my first "grown-up" tool is worthless as a marketplace commodity – assimilated into the domain of a multitude of vastly superior pounding tools now available at Sears and elsewhere. Yet it was, and still is to me, priceless as a symbol of my father's recognition of my emerging adult competence and trustworthiness. A hammer is one thing, perhaps a minor one. But economic value is stretched well beyond its credible boundaries when used as the value of a human life, of human autonomy, of a constitution of a state, of an old-growth forest, of a wetland, of the public "good", or of our relations to future generations of persons. To name but a few. Is (as economic theory demands) one wetland (whether built by nature or constructed by conservation biologists) as good as the next? And only valuable in relation to the condominiums that we might otherwise develop on such valuable real estate? The notions of "mitigation banking" and "habitat banking" that natural capitalists tout as successful applications of their theory of value take advantage of that theory's support for building a fake wetland in a poor location for condos to substitute for the loss of a real wetland in a location that makes a lot of money for the developer. Economic value is thereby increased.

Second, it is surely naive to think that unrelenting preference satisfaction leads to greater overall value – let alone a better life – for all. The claim that it does is an empirical one. It may be true or it may be false. To believe it true is to ignore the overwhelmingly negative effect of placing all (considered) values in the strategic environment of the marketplace. I think that this becomes clear when we consider the world of market transactions as the strategic backdrop for all deliberation. This is the world in which every isolated actor looks out for her own interests. She tries to satisfy as many of her preferences as possible, with no obligation (or inclination) to consider any other interests – except insofar as they immediately effect hers. Critically, each actor acts with the understanding that this is how the other actors are playing the game, too.

The phrase "playing the game" is apt. This is the world of game theory that so intrigues economists. But as game theory shows, it is a world in which actors are notoriously denied the best opportunities for leading a good life. In the absence of the good and meaningful kinds of social relationships that may establish expectations for cooperation, an entire universe of opportunities is made completely inaccessible. As a result, each actor is confined to a set of choices in a universe where the value opportunities are severely constricted. In such a universe, an actor cannot possibly realize the best in life. The best of the remaining choices may be (and it seems, often is) poor, or even utterly vile. But in this kind of strategic world – one that excludes even the possibility of the truly best choices – the isolated individual actor must embrace the poor, or the utterly vile as the choice that serves her narrow interests. That is what she "prefers". As a result, that is what registers in economic inventory-taking. [A player in this economic game is known as "economic man".]

Third, the economic view of "human welfare" is so radically subjective that it seems to preclude any normative standard at all. It seems quite naive to unquestioningly assume that what any person prefers to acquire in a trade enhances her "welfare" and therefore enhances the total "welfare" of all. A raft of circumstances contribute to this. There is self-destructive behavior. There is grossly misplaced and misconstrued wants. There is the general difficulty of any person determining what is really in her best interest – especially when subjected to the psychological manipulations of modern marketing.

There is even less justification in supposing that total "welfare" is increased when any person satisfies her preferences. To suppose this is to embrace the unworthy interests of bad people and even monsters – tyrants, barbarians, serial rapists – along with worthy interests. They are all interests, and economic preference satisfaction has no possible way to differentiate them. The "moral neutrality" of economic value cannot and does not discriminate. It therefore cannot discount, let alone discard entirely the interest of moral barbarians.

Fourth, economic value is built on a foundation of thoroughgoing injustice. The marketplace is red in the pocketbook. The weak players – the poor and powerless – count for less because they have less to spend. Their very lives count for less in the economic calculus because they are willing to accept less remuneration for economic development that literally poisons them. They accept bad deals because they have few choices; and for the poorest, all of the deals are bad. The preferences of the rich are represented and considered more than those of the poor. And not just proportionally more, according to how much more rich they are. Because the rich are also powerful. And with that power comes a disproportionate control of social and political institutions, which consequently become levers for even greater consideration of their preferences. The end result is a wholesale violation of the equal consideration principle – perhaps the single most basic principle of justice.

As we have indicated, these are not the only problems. The list is quite long. But for our current purpose, they suffice to suggest that we should be alarmed at the use of economic reasoning to ascribe value in most contexts – including the context of complex natural systems. Taken out of its natural marketplace habitat, economic value is a frightening cartoon of a theory of value.

2 The paradox of using economics to defend nature

In his essay "Beyond Hope" (Orion, 2006), Derrick Jensen comments:
Most ... environmentalists are fighting desperately, using whatever tools they have – or rather whatever legal tools they have, which means whatever tools those in power grant them the right to use, which means whatever tools will be ultimately ineffective – to try to protect some piece of ground, to try to stop the manufacture or release of poisons, to try to stop civilized humans from tormenting some group of plants or animals. Sometimes they're reduced to trying to protect just one tree...
Among other environmentalists, Jensen's passage describes well-intentioned natural capitalists, who have have latched onto the tool of economic reasoning.

2.1 Destroying the environment in the name of economic value

I have argued that, as a general theory of value, economic value is a cartoon.

But it is undeniably ensconced in the policy-making conventions of our social institutions – the institutions that wield power. From that leverage point, the theory of value as economic value is largely responsible for the kind of thinking and attitudes that underlie human activities that have destroyed earth's natural systems and are currently finishing the job. That is because, by traditional economic lights, natural systems are purely and simply fodder for the economic engine that increases economic value – satisfying the wants and desires of economic man.

It can be argued (and has been, elsewhere in this blog), that unless this economic concept of value is reined back into its proper and very restricted domain (of efficiently running a business), unless it is framed by a real, coherent general theory of the good life, it will continue to justify and fuel the economic engine that completes the destructive project that it unleashed in the first place. By all indications, it is doing just that. The devastation is, if anything accelerating. And economic evaluation is squarely behind it.

2.2 Saving the environment in the name of economic value (natural capitalism)

So it is an exquisitely painful irony that some economists have deployed their concept of economic value (aka "human welfare") to stop the devastation. At the very least, it seems odd to suggest that the solution to a problem is to perpetuate its cause. How can this possibly work?

The reasoning goes like this: Why are humans engaging in activities that are accelerating the destruction of nature? At bottom, there is really just a single answer. It is because we humans value most other things more than we value nature. For us, the value of intact natural systems falls so far below the value of what we believe we gain (the consumptive preferences that we satisfy) by destroying them – using them as fuel for the economic engine – that the destruction barely registers as a contravening consideration.

But what if we could show that, contrary to our initial assumptions, destroying nature actually destroys what we value? That is the Holy Grail of many who feel, some with great conviction, that nature has enormous value, and that its irrevocable destruction is an unspeakably enormous loss of that value for all humans now and forever.

If anything, this latter day Holy Grail is more elusive than the original. The conviction that there really is enormous value in intact natural systems seems suspended in space – with no visible support or suspending thread. It is frustratingly difficult to find a justifying foundation for nature's great value.

Casting about for the values that strongly influence modern attitudes and behavior, we inevitably stumble into the dominant evaluative force of modern society. The juggernaut that powers the decision engine of society and apparently even widely adopted by many individuals, is none other than economic value grounded in the calculus of human preferences.

From the economic viewpoint, the question:
What if we could show that, contrary to our initial assumptions, destroying nature actually destroys what we value?
is transformed into
What if we could show that previously unbeknownst to us, our economic self-interests are damaged – that is, economic value is reduced – when we damage natural systems?
So it is that we are led to ask if we might ascribe economic value to nature. Asking this question and trying to answer it – really, trying to answer it with a prejudice for ascribing as great an economic value as possible, to save as much of nature as possible – is the "Natural Capital Project" (http://naturalcapitalproject.org). Those who pursue this project call themselves "natural capitalists".

3 Where science and scientists come in

When economists go to compute the value of nature – the economic value as "natural capital" – they need to slice and dice natural systems into pieces amenable to economic accounting. An account of natural systems for economic accounting is one in which nature is modeled as a collection of commodities. Each commodity comprises multiple units – the pieces from the aforementioned slicing and dicing. And each unit is, or at least (for the purposes of economic computation) must be considered indistinguishable from the next. Then, the economic value of nature is revealed as the price units of these natural commodities command in a marketplace – real or imagined.

But how do we identify the "chunks" of natural systems – chunks of stuff (natural resources). Or chunks of services rendered? (Our economy is now largely a "services economy", a fact not lost on the natural capitalists.) When we stare at a forested mountain, a tropical jungle, a salt marsh, where do we draw the lines to define the chunks that we can trade? How do we identify the units of service –- sequestering carbon, filtering water – that it provides? There's a lot of stuff in there – leaves and soil and roots and insects and bigger animals and bacteria and lots more. And there are a lot stuff going on there – nitrogen being fixed, carbon being assimilated, water being circulated, temperatures being regulated, plants being pollinated, and lots, lots more.

This is where scientists come in. Eager to do their part to abate the accelerating destruction of nature, scientists oblige environmental economists by giving them chunked up, commoditized versions of nature – something as ready and fit to be traded as a microwave at your local Walmart. As I argue in the following sections, these are a grotesquely cartoonish versions of scientists' real understanding of nature. The end result, I think, is that wonderfully good scientists create cartoon versions of their work to prop up a cartoon theory of natural value.

4 Why scientists should not compromise their science

I need to emphasize that I believe that it is cartoon versions of their science, not their real science, that scientists feed into the economic calculus. My case is based on four deep and abiding concerns – concerns that I believe scientists in the natural capital program would share.

First, it seems highly likely that if the Natural Capital Project succeeds – in the sense of being accepted as the primary tool for assigning value to nature – then it will utterly fail in its objective of halting nature's devastation. In fact, it will succeed in justifying an ever more accelerating and ever more thorough devastation of nature, just as economic thinking has all along. The major (though not the only) reason for this has to do with technology. Whatever economic value we can find in nature – in terms of either resources supplied or "ecosystem services" rendered – will increasingly be supplantable and therefore, supplanted by cheaper and therefore economically more desirable (i.e., economically more valuable) technological surrogates.

Consider the classic and oft-cited case described by Rickets T.H., Daily, G.C., Ehrlich, P.R., and Michener, C.D., "Economic Value of Tropical Forest to Coffee Production", Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS), 101:34 (August 24, 2002), pp. 12579-12582. This study seemed to demonstrate that wild bees living on the periphery of a Costa Rican coffee farm contributed "pollination services" that substantially increased coffee production. Thus, it may have seemed, the best economic value of the forested periphery land was realized by leaving it forested, as a habitat for the bee polliinators.

But what if we found that we could domesticate these bees and keep them in hives? Or what if we found even more efficient, non-wild pollinators that did not need the forest habitat? What if a clever engineer invented a cheap super-pollinating device that could out-pollinate any bee now or ever, and by wide margin? What if the farmer determined that another crop, not requiring native pollinators, would be more profitable? Then the now-forested land would become more (economically) valuable for other uses – most likely, after the forest is cleared. The questions we posed were "what if" questions. But is there really any doubt that they are more legitimately "when" questions?

Unlike the "what if" questions, the "when" question is an empirical question. It has an empirical answer that we may legitimately decline to try to answer before the fact. That should not make us lose sight of the power of the "what if" questions which make it plain that a natural capitalist is committed to welcome any turn of events that frees the forest as a hostage chained to its economic value as a home for pollinating bees.

As a matter of fact, it really was a question of "when" for the bees. Soon after the study, the price of coffee dropped precipitously. The farm replaced its coffee plantings with pineapple which did not have the coffee plants' pollination needs. When that happened, natural capitalists should have lobbied to "develop" the forested land. Left standing and no longer providing the basis for any service, it had been transformed from a possible benefit into a definite opportunity cost. On natural capitalist principles, cutting down the forest for development is the right action – the action that increases "human welfare". Perhaps it's even the required action; it would be reprehensible to do otherwise. (See McCauley, D.J., "Selling out on nature", Nature, 443:7 (September 2006), pp. 27-28 (http://www.fsd.nl/naturevaluation/75062). See also the anemic responses to McCauley's commentary – some of which we cite below – in the same issue of Nature.)

Two further conditions exacerbate the downward spiral of natural economic value. For one thing, we often come to understand how an ecosystem really works only after it fails. Almost as often, that juncture is also when we come to understand the ecosystem's economic value – the services it was quietly providing without our being aware. Why does our knowledge so often have this retrospective (as opposed to predictive) quality? It is because ecosystems are so complex – there are so many interacting variables and factors – that even the most brilliant and clever ecologists never know them all. In their investigations, they cannot even control for all that they do know. But a point of failure provides an anchor from which clever scientists can play detective, and trace back through the serious of insults that led up to it. They can reconstruct how, one by one, each successive insult removed some incremental ability of the system to recover from the next insult. Finally comes the understanding of the final insult – the proximate cause of failure – as the one that acted on a system devoid of resilience. Applied to a system with no further ability to compensate or adjust, we understand how that final insult – in a single, dramatic quantum leap – pushed the system into its final state of low and degraded functioning. Alas, at that point, the ecosystem's value – economic or otherwise – has plummeted. There is little left to salvage. There is little left to love or to value.

The other exacerbating condition is a positive, sociological feedback that strongly reinforces the inexorable decline of natural capital. As natural systems vanish, they vanish from human consideration. They therefore vanish from human preferences to preserve them. But since these preferences are the ultimate basis of all economic value, their economic value vanishes, too. There is already strong and growing evidence of this positive feedback effect (http://www.world-science.net/othernews/080204_nature).

It is worth noting that a true natural capitalist – a true believer in the economic conception of natural value – should welcome this result. Viewed through an economic lens, it is good news indeed, because it means that little or nothing of (economic) value is lost with the loss of any part of the natural world that doesn't provide resources or services that (at least at the moment) cannot be provided inexpensively by human technology. The already-evident bottom line of economic reckoning will become ever more clear. "Human welfare" increases as we make use of now (otherwise) valueless places in nature. "Human welfare" will increase as we appropriate places that now have no place in human consideration – except as places for highways, housing developments, oil exploration, and shipping lanes. All of these things, after all, satisfy strong, deeply entrenched preferences.

The second element of my case is that, by presenting a cartoon version of their science for the purpose of economic analysis, and by putting their imprimatur on it, scientists sabotage critical public thinking on, and deliberation about nature's value. Firstly, they compromise the credibility of their own science. With scientific credibility already under assault from other (politically prejudiced) quarters, it seems grossly irresponsible for scientists to volunteer for an inside job. Secondly, they marginalize the vitally needed, messy, and complex real science by thrusting it into the shadow of its grossly oversimplified cartoon version. It is the credible and real science of natural systems – the science that depicts nature in its real, interconnected, gnarly, and admitted largely unknown complexity, and as part of an equally complex historical unfolding of geological, biological, and chemical systems – that is irreplaceable as the factual backdrop for a full, rich, and satisfying picture of natural value.

Third, even now, with technology in its current state (see the first point of this section), much of what scientists appear to value in natural systems is just not worth saving according to honestly done economic analyses. Economic valuation looks at the "marginal (economic) value" – the value of protecting the next commoditized unit – one more species (say the right whale) or one more hectare of habitat (say, old-growth temperate rainforest). As a matter of empirical fact, the marginal values of such "commodities" are often vanishingly small. It is just a bad (economic) deal to save the next right whale or the next hectare of old-growth rainforest. The probabilities of these natural entities having some economic in the future is so vanishingly small, that this kind of future-looking consideration adds essentially nothing to their net present economic value.

For a discussion of the rainforests, see Bulte, E., Van Kooten, G.C., "Economic Science, Endangered Species, and Biodiversity Loss", Conservation Biology, 14:1 (February 2000), pp. 113-119. As they point out, the enormous timber value of the trees and the superior carbon uptake of a plantation of young, fast-growing saplings that could replace the old-growth trees strongly militate against saving most of what remains of these ancient forests – on economic grounds.

For a discussion of right whales, consider the logic (and ignore the crudeness) of the imagined poster of "Those goddamn whales" (http://environmentalvalues.blogspot.com/2008/04/those-goddamn-whales.html). That character is the mouthpiece of the economist who understands that right whales (unlike the ancient forests) have essentially no economic value and that slowing down ships to avoid ramming them has a measurable economic cost. Therefore, "human welfare" is increased by continuing to sail ships at full throttle, no matter how many individual whales are injured or killed, and despite the significant contribution towards the species' extinction. To embrace natural capitalism is to enthusiastically embrace the extinction of the right whales, happy in the knowledge that it truly serves "human welfare".

The previous three points argue that economic valuation is impotent in preventing natural destruction. That might be an unhappy result for some of us. But if we were honest, we should embrace it as the honest moral truth about nature: It's just not worth much.

The fourth point gets back to value and the damage that economic valuation does to natural value. Natural capitalism teaches us that it is the right thing to let a developer build condos in a wetland in exchange for constructing an artificial one elsewhere. It teaches us that the forest around that Costa Rican coffee plantation did suddenly plummet in value when the farmer replaced the coffee with pineapple. It teaches us that we should enthusiastically embrace the extinction of the right whales – happy in the knowledge that their demise serves "human welfare" by permitting shippers to reduce their costs and therefore ours as consumers of the shipped goods. In short, I would say that any value that we place in nature is sabotaged by this economic conception of its value.

5 A digression: The problems within the economic field of view

Before proceeding with the main thread of the argument, I should acknowledge that at least some environmental economists sense the difficulty of identifying the valuable chunks in the first place. They see that there are an awful lot of chunks of stuff – not just in number, but in type. They aren't packaged in any neat or uniform way. Ecosystem services are particularly tricky to identify in a way that is directly linked to its economic benefit. Confusion about this can lead to double-counting. See, for example, Boyd, J., "The Nonmarket Benefits of Nature: What Should be Counted in Green GDP?", Resources for the Future (RFF) DP 06-24, May 2006.

By Boyd's lights, these difficulties are merely technical ones that are surmounted by careful estimation techniques on the one hand, and careful accounting on the other. Thus, we can estimate the distribution of timber densities in the forest, weigh certain services by their availability (proximity) to human settlements, or, as seems increasingly common, take a survey of previously published economic results (which seems a methodologically vexed approach). According to Boyd, we just have to be careful to tie an ecosystem service to its marketable benefit.

Economists are also concerned that much of the "stuff" from natural systems and perhaps most of their services don't actually enter into the marketplace in the way required by economic theory. This is very inconvenient for a theory that is focused entirely on market value – or rather, value as expressed in the context of a market transaction. Even when natural "goods" do enter into transactions, there are often "externalities" (costs or benefits that don't accrue to the parties in the transaction) that skew the actual market price (aka "economic value").

Confronted with this dilemma, one might think that it wise to take a step back to ask if the value of every "thing" – a natural system or a human life, for example – can be conceived in terms of value-in-a-transaction. Not economists. They have a facile solution for their apparent predicament: If there are no real prices in a real market, invent them. The prices. And the market.

The reader with no economic training may think that this defies common sense. I'm afraid that it does; but it is nonetheless how economic valuation is done. For goods that are not traded at all, "shadow prices" are substituted for the market prices that would exist were there a real market for them. How, you may ask, do we find these prices, if there is no real market? By economists' lights this is "tricky" but "just" another technical difficulty – one easily surmounted by clever estimation techniques, value proxies (for example, hedonic pricing), preference (for example, contingent evaluation) surveys, and various theoretical constructs that, so far as I can tell, are supported (if at all) by thin analogies and armchair speculation about hypothetical situations. The ultimate estimation technique that professional economists use is the survey of previously offered and unsupported estimation techniques.

These are the problems in economists' field of view. They are the launching pad for taking off into the stratosphere of economic equilibrium theory and flailing away at the "technical difficulties" in framing natural systems as natural capital. In the process, many Ph.D. candidates turn into Ph.D economists and many Ph.D. economists make many calculations of natural capital and publish those calculations in many economic (and scientific) journals.

It is extremely distressing to me that the most basic and vexed premises – the ones about natural value as natural capital – that fueled the launch in the first place are left far behind and untouched. A very few "environmentally enlightened" economists such as Jim Boyd mention them. But he and others that do quickly brush them aside and just forge ahead with the economics. Far more often, these premises are never even acknowledged.

6 Natural capitalism: Cartoon science for a world of cartoon value

I now get to the part of my argument that, I think, should especially concern scientists in their role as scientists. (In their role as moral agents like the rest of us, I hope that scientists will also reflect on the preceding discussion of the principles of economic value and the implications of using economic valuation to value nature.)

Why do wonderfully good scientists who produce wonderfully good science offer cartoons instead of real science to economists? The section on Where science and scientists come in hints at the answer.

The economic calculus works with commodities (in the sense that we prescribed at the outset) that comprise collections of discrete, atomic, largely static and non-interacting, and indistinguishable chunks of "stuff" (or services) that can be traded in a market and that are therefore viewed in the narrow timeframe of a market transaction. Unfortunately, natural systems are not anything like this.

No matter how brilliant the scientist, when she attempts to reduce an ecosystem to simple economic parameters, the ecosystem is no longer recognizable as the thing that it is. Gone are the complex guts of a natural system that makes it interesting to scientists. Gone are the myriad components and threads of myriad processes that intertwine and interact in every possible time frame – from seconds to years to millennia and beyond. Gone are the interconnections at every possible spatial frame – from direct contact to downstream to the other side of the planet. Gone are the impossible-to-predict chains of events that stem from even the seemingly smallest and least significant perturbation or insult, but that lead to major, irreversible changes.

What remains is an eviscerated depiction of nature. What remains, I think, is something like a Toontown version of science – a cartoon that makes economic calculations possible. Gone are the guts. Gone too are the significant, non-economic values that (unlike economic value) just might make nature worth saving.

Let's examine this more closely – first by way of a common example of environmental economics, and then by way of analogy.

6.1 An example: The economic value of a unit of forest

We have this very typical statement from an environmentally concerned economist:
The shadow price of an asset represents the change in welfare due to an incremental change in stock, and is the value we assign (or impute) to that resource. So for example, the shadow price of deforestation is how much worse off we are due to an incremental loss of forest, and the physical change is the forest area change between this year and last year. Our total welfare loss is the product of these two components, i.e. the unit cost of deforestation multiplied by the total area lost.
We have already encountered the notion of a shadow price. We offer no further comment here, except to remind ourselves that when an economist says that these are not real market prices, this should not be misinterpreted to be even the slightest departure from the basic economic conception of value as conferred to something as an object of trade. Rather, with that phrase, economists are saying that, as an inconvenient matter of fact, there exists no perfectly functioning market (according to the precepts of neoclassical economics), for units (in this case) of a forest commodity. In the best of economic worlds, there could be. In any case, we can imagine such a world well enough to approximate the commodity's "true" price.

So what picture do scientists paint of a forest as a basis for economic evaluation?

First, it is a collection of homogeneous hectares – a very uninteresting jigsaw puzzle with identically sized and identically shaped (square, I would imagine) pieces. For as we have seen, the calculation of economic value presumes a market for a commodity – something with units that are (for market purposes) indistinguishable.

Second, to attach a value to each unit of the forest commodity, scientists find some goods (and bads) in each of these averaged hectares. And they find some services (and disservices) averaged over them all.

How many economic goods (or bads)? How many services (or disservices)? The list is typically short. Very short.

For a forest, the lion's share of the resource goods typically comes from the timber – the market value of the "harvest" from an average hectare. The lion's share of the service goods (again, for a forest) typically comes from its carbon-processing capability – the average that is recaptured from the troposphere and the incremental economic benefit of avoiding the need to deal with whatever climate havoc that bit of atmospheric carbon (as carbon dioxide) might have caused.

To be sure, other goods are mentioned from time to time. There's the "potential for the miracle cancer cure" gambit. But as previously mentioned, for any reasonable set of assumptions about likelihood, that value is typically miniscule compared to timber value. Modern society's technological prowess in synthesizing chemicals also rears its value-diminishing head.

"Environmentally very enlightened" economists often tip their hats to "aesthetic cost" of a clear-cut hectare. Recreational costs of such a forest use are dutifully cited, too. But these costs are again tiny – and diminishing with our increasing disinclination go there or to find one of these increasingly rare places. Economists rarely take into account the opportunity cost of not replacing relatively unpopular and boring forest hectarage with a far more popular Disney theme park. But by their own precepts, they should.

There are the birds, and sometimes, as in a previously mentioned example, the (pollinating) bees. But the birds only make biologists and bird-watchers happy; there are so few of them (and sadly, also the birds, which have been disproportionately affected by the current great wave of extinction) that their preferences barely register. And the bees? We've already noted how their contribution to value can (and in the cited famous case did) vanish literally overnight.

Almost never are the economic bads mentioned. For many forests (such as old-growth temperate forests), the services they perform by sequestering carbon are negative, not positive in value. The trees represent not a benefit, but rather the opportunity cost of not replacing them with vigorously growing plantation monocultures that sequester carbon at far higher rates.

We are left with a picture of the forest as a collection of generic hectares – units of stock on the shelves of a natural Walmart. Each unit of stock yields a certain amount of timber and provides a poor to rather bad service in snatching carbon out of the air. Its unit (marginal) value is what such a unit commands in a market transaction.

6.2 The forest as science really sees it

How does this picture of an anonymous unit of forest fit with our best science? How does it fit with ecology? Or with systems theory?

It doesn't. I think that it doesn't even come close. There's barely anything that is scientifically recognizable. How does it miss the mark? It's hard to know where to begin, and even harder to know where to end, in answering that question. At least, we begin.

What do scientists really see when they look at a forest? Nothing like an homogeneous commodity with two or three value-determining characteristics. Instead they see that:

-> The effect on the community (species) structure of an ecosystem depends critically on which patch of forest is destroyed. For example, island biogeography demonstrates that eliminating the population island that is the principle recolonizing source for satellite patches subject to periodic, but perhaps infrequent disturbance (e.g. drought) could wipe out all populations in the region. In a tropical forest, where distances between individual trees of the same species may be great, a single tree may be a population island for species-specific insects.

-> The effect on community structure also may critically depend on whether "harvesting" leaves one large area intact, or whether it leaves a patchwork of many small fragments, or whether the entire area was uniformly "thinned".

-> Trees removed near a stream or lake will have a different effect on erosion, leaf litter, habitat for insects, the amount of unfiltered, sediment-laden runoff, and the consequent vitality of fish and aquatic invertebrate populations. Any of these changes could be utterly transforming.

-> The relative ability of different organisms to act and react to different kinds of changes comes into play. The success of some species to adjust and the failure of others to do so could easily lead to dramatic changes in trophic interactions. Any reduction in forest area will have a greater adverse impact on large predators that require larger territories. Trees removed from a mountaintop "island" will have a far greater effect on land-bound organisms compared to birds.

-> The decline of some species could make the forest more susceptible to alien invasions that would be a strong positive feedback for a further decline of native species.

-> The removal of trees may have relatively hard-to-calibrate effects, such as the the greater sensible heat and higher local temperatures that result from the decreased albedo in a way that hinges on small details in the pattern of tree removal.

And then there are the cascading effects that ecological science cannot predict – including ones that directly impinge on human lives. Any of these scenarios are possible, but our total ignorance of them or their likelihood make them impossible to evaluate:

-> The demise of large predators leads to an explosion of smaller, disease-carrying animals. The people who are encouraged to move into the cleared spaces have increased contact with these animals. A parasite is given the opportunity to infect human hosts. A new and devastating human disease is born.

-> Humans now in close proximity to the forest bring their livestock, and with them parasites that, for the first time, infect the native forest creatures. Or they build the inevitable roads, perhaps using asphalt, that further changes the characteristics of soil drainage, leaches toxins, and causes shifts in wind patterns, and consequently temperature and humidity. The forest dies, giving way to grasslands.

-> With the decrease in albedo and increase in heat comes more fire and the "need" to clear more forest to reduce its risk. With this positive feedback, the cutting down of the forest accelerates until almost none is left.

These intertwining and interacting complexities can be viewed through an additional lens – that of complex systems analysis. From that discipline we know that complex systems may appear to continue to function – at least for a time – after component parts are compromised. The role of the compromised component is discovered only when a disturbance or combination of disturbances makes its role apparent. Economic calculations never take into account the large temporal and spatial dimensions needed to observe and understand this. Thus, logging and even clear-cutting may go on for decades without any apparent problem (except aesthetic). Then, for example, a bark beetle infestation may destroy the entire forest – perhaps, as it turns out, because along with the trees went the nesting sites for the birds that fed on the beetle.

6.3 The economic view of one forest
In some cases, actions taken on economic grounds preempt any need to wait or to worry about the subtleties, gross uncertainties, and impossibly entangled causal webs of real ecological science.

It is worth mentioning such a case – also noteworthy because in it, timber is (or was) not the dominant economic value of the forest. In Madagascar, a rare coastal tropical forest was just an obstacle to realizing the far greater economic value of another resource. As an economist would say, the forest was an "opportunity cost" because it hindered the extraction of the vastly more (economically) valuable ilmenite.
Increasing the economic value
of Madagascar's coastal forest land.


Ilmenite is the mineral source for titanium dioxide. Its economic value in Madagascar derives from the use of titanium dioxide as a white pigment, in the discontinuation of lead-based white pigments, and in the exhaustion of the Australian and South African sources of ilmenite. In this case, the trees were just collateral cost for the economic benefit of coloring things white – quite literally, the "good" of white-washing.

This case illustrates how our collective desires (preferences) for white house paint, white plastics, white toothpaste, and white-tinted cosmetics represent an economic value that far exceeds that of a rare kind of coastal tropical forest that is home to some of the rarest creatures on the planet. Whiteness in our life has more value than the precarious marine ecosystems that adjoin the ilmenite mine. It has more value than the ways of living and livelihood of the people who were uprooted to make way for the mine, a new port, and a network of roads. It is an economic benefit so great that it offsets the spread of HIV/aids
Lemur catta (Ring-tailed lemurs)
from the influx of migrant labor into Madagascar from the HIV-riddled African mainland.

Certainly, the mining company executives of Rio Tinto are being richly rewarded. In economic terms, the benefit far exeeds the cost of the total devastation of the local land and culture. It evidently also more than compensates for the fact that ultimately, after the mining is over and done in just a few decades (according to Rio Tinto's own projections), there will be no local economy at all. That has been accounted for in the net present value of the mining operations.

Of course, that still leaves out the preferences of lemurs to continue their (various) species' existence. And as you can see, that really pisses them off.

6.4 A brief digression: An enigma about scientists

Again, we digress – this time, for a very brief observation. Concern about many of the science-defying problems that we have expressed are acknowledged by scientists that are the very bulwark of the Natural Capital Project. See, for example, Daily, G.C., Söderqvist, T., Aniyar, S., Arrow, K., Dasgupta, P., Ehrlich, P.R., Folke, C., Jansson, A., Jansson, B., Kautsky, N., Levin, S., Lubchenco, J., Mäler, K., Simpson, D., Styarrett, D., Tilman, D., and Walker, B., "The Value of Nature and the Nature of Value", Science, 289:5478 (21 July 2000), pp. 395-396 (http://cisac.stanford.edu/publications/value_of_nature_and_the_nature_of_value_the/).

These authors characterize their concerns as "limitations of the scope of valuation". But they somehow cannot bring themselves to follow their own strong and correct instinct to the conclusion (that should be more obvious to them as highly trained scientists than to the rest of us as mere reasoning citizens) that this "limitation of scope" dictates a limitation of the science used in valuation to cartoon versions of their own excellent science. Enigmatically, they just turn their back on their own work that demonstrates, for example, that "highly interdependent and seemingly small changes in one place cause large impacts on the overall system."

7 An analogy from chess

I'd like to offer an analogy for the cartoon quality of science-in-the-service of economics. It comes from the world of chess.

Consider a critical juncture in a match between grandmaster players. We assess the board positions of white and black. We do this by taking an inventory of the chess pieces (resources) and give each resource a conventional value (commodity price). Actually, chess players view a chess piece more as a "chess service" than a resource. A piece's conventional value reflects a generally agreed upon generalized capability or function that it performs. In the chess marketplace, trades (aka piece exchanges) might be judged in terms of these values.

For the board in our grandmaster match, the inventory might be:

White: 1 knight @$3/knight, 2 bishops @$3/bishop, 3 pawns @$1/pawn, 1 king @$???

Black: 1 bishop @$3/knight, 1 rook @$5/rook, 2 pawns @$1/pawn, king @$???

In this chess economics, we find that white is worth $12 – $2 more than black's $10.

Are we satisfied that we have properly valued the position? That white's chess welfare is better than black's?

No, of course not. This is a cartoon valuation of the chess position built on a cartoon description of it. The description does not capture the lion's share of what we need to know about chess reality in order to arrive at meaningful chess values. Only someone ignorant of or purposely ignoring the complexities chess "systems" could deny this. I would say that this would be as ignorant as valuing natural systems based on the numbers that come from similarly static, highly truncated, and narrowly selective inventories of goods and services that happen to satisfy current human preferences.

Does it matter that "we got the numbers right" in our chess evaluation? (We did.) Does it matter that "at least we have some numbers, even if they're not the only ones"? (Again, we did.)

The answers are, of course, "No" and "No, again." To think of the value of black's rook (as we have) without regard to how its position relates to every other black piece individually and in every possible grouping, to think of its value independent of its relationship with every white piece and every possible group of white pieces – is senseless. Absent information about where each individual piece is placed on the board, absent an understanding the myriad dynamic relationships that exist between each piece and every other – not just in the current position, but in every possible development of it – our static chess inventory has no meaning.

As a consequence, it is a meaningless basis for assessing chess value, or the value of white's position versus black's. Chess novices quickly come to realize that a single-minded focus on reducing their opponents' piece inventory rarely produces a winning position. They quickly find out about gambits. Any merely competent chess player can easily construct a board position that has the chess economics that we have specified for our grandmaster match, but in which black checkmates white in the next move.

So it is with natural systems. Insofar as we can neatly define "pieces" in nature – for example, the individual plants and animals in population ecology – they cannot be understood independent of a raft of dynamically evolving relationships with each other and with myriad non-biotic conditions and processes. Nor can we dismiss the fact that each individual is unique. We know that some individuals can play unique and pivotal roles in their ecosystem dynamics. One views individual organisms as commodities at a considerable scientific risk.

The major point of disanalogy is that much or even most of nature cannot be understood as neatly defined "chunks" that resemble pieces on a chess board. We can carve up a forest in any number of ways achieve an equal number of perspectives on how it works. This is part of the creative art of ecologists. But the ecologist understands that each of the myriad chunks in each of these frameworks is connected to the chunks in its own framework, as well as to the different-in-kind-and-in-spatial-and-temporal-size chunks in all other frameworks through webs (not lines) of interactions that are as varied as the interacting nodes (chunks).

Yet, we still have not exhausted all that matters, even in chess. It does not suffice to just consider the continually changing threads of interactions on the chess board starting from the specified position. That alone fails to provide the complete story in a real tournament between real people. The history of the game leading to the current position may be critically important. How much time remains on white's clock versus black's as a result of their previous struggles? Has white's piece superiority come at a high mental cost from parrying one clever and aggressive thrust after another from black? With less time left on white's clock, what mental resilience does that player have in reserve?

Again, so it is with natural systems. The history of insults to them counts. What the insults were. In what sequence they were inflicted. Ecologists know that. But it is not in any way reflected in the cartoons they draw for economists. The economic calculus demands the cartoon.

The economic calculus does compute what economists call "dynamic efficiency". But the "dynamic" part of that has to do with allocating resources in different periods of time. In the world view of natural capitalism, it does nothing to change the cartoon of nature as a stock of discrete chunks of essentially non-interacting stuff. All it says is that some chunks can be taken off the shelves of nature's warehouse now; other chunks can be taken off the shelves later.

Consider this other question couched in terms of our chess analogy. What are we to make of the king? What is its chess value? Is it infinite? It is part of the inventory; so it must have some value. Perhaps a chess player would say that its value is infinite. Perhaps, by saying this, she would mean that there is no game without the king. A checkmate ends the game. So it doesn't even make sense to ascribe a conventional point value to the king.

Economic theory does not brook this view. Economists deny that there is anything of infinite value. I believe that the real meaning of this claim is "there is nothing whose value is not, at bottom, economic value. Therefore, people who give this answer in a contingent evaluation study (a survey used to determine human preferences) are summarily dismissed. Economists do not hesitate to throw out data that do not fit their theory. That is something that should make a scientist squirm.

To make the rest of us squirm, an economist would likely suggest that the king's value is something like the value we are willing to pay to make a polluter refrain from pouring toxins into drinking water that will likely cut short our life. It is exactly analogous to the economic value of a human life – the notion that human value is directly tied to and limited by preferences for the goods that a polluter creates. This basic confusion about value in general, and human value in particular is central to the illusion (and delusion) that economic value represents human welfare, or can represent natural value.

8 Postscript: A field guide to economic protestations to the contrary

It is useful to anticipate at least one type of response from the proponents of natural capitalism. This is the claim that economic value theory can be fixed. Though it starts out as a hollow theory of general value, it is a worthy framework on which we can hang all kinds of value as a kind of retrofit. What about, "existence value"? And "aesthetic value"? And "cultural value"?

I will submit my position on this and leave the arguments for another paper. I believe that:
  • One cannot, as an afterthought, retrofit a theory fundamentally designed to achieve market advantage, so as to transform it into a theory of general value or a general theory of the good.
  • One cannot, as an afterthought, retrofit a theory whose strategic environment precludes some of the greatest and most basic of human goods, to usher those goods in through a back door.
  • One cannot, as an afterthought, retrofit coherence into a theory of value whose fundamental principles cannot distinguish between what is desired and what is good.
  • One cannot, as an afterthought, retrofit justice into a theory built on principles that are fundamentally unjust.
Economists try (and claim) to do all these things. I hope that this paper provides some tools for recognizing these kinds of retrofitting projects. And I hope that it provides tools to help understand why they are very misguided.

Here we have time for just two examples.

Example 1: Contemplating situations like the one in Madagascar, economists protest: "No, no. Our conception of value is not as narrow as you claim. Yes, we value natural systems on the basis of the "ecosystem services" provided. But we also gladly add to our calculations their 'cultural services'." (See, for example, Reid, W.V., "Nature: the many benefits of ecosystem services", Nature, 443 (October 2006), p. 749.)

"A cultural service". The surest field guide tip to the fact that we have not escaped the strong gravitational field of pure economic reasoning is that word. "Service". If you're an economist you'll not bat an eyelash. If you're not an economist, this will sound profoundly strange. Unnerving, even.

I would urge that you trust your instincts.

Ask yourself: "Are the symbols of your cultural heritage, which may include the burial places of your parents and theirs, or the traditional places for meeting, or the traditional ways of finding basic sustenance that tie your life to that of your ancestors and that you envision will tie yours to that of your descendants – do you conceive of these as things that you might sell in a market transaction?

Ask yourself: "Is the value of a culture the sum total of human preferences to sustain it, weighted by how strongly those preferences are backed by an ability to pay to satisfy them?" On that basis – the basis of economic valuation – poor subsistence cultures are nearly valueless. That, of course, is part of the economic justification for the disruption and destruction of such cultures in Madagascar and other places.

Example 2: Confronted with economically justifiable (and justified) devastation such as we have in Madagascar, where mining corporation executives are the biggest beneficiaries, natural capitalists often offer a certain non-sequitur. I call it the "take your eyes off the major beneficiaries of economic valuation and blame it on the poor" gambit. Here is a textbook example (from one response to Douglas McCauley's commentary, cited above):
The conservation debate cannot be reduced to a choice between protecting nature or making an extra million for a yacht or villa. If it were, then perhaps moral arguments alone would be enough to protect the environment. The reality is that poor people are deforesting vast areas of tropical forest for subsistence agriculture...

Marvier, M., Grant, J., and Kareiva, P., "Nature: poorest may see it as their economic rival", Nature, 443 (October 2006), pp. 749-750.
On similar grounds, Kareiva and his colleagues would point out that the Madagascar mining operation offers steady employment for some people. In Kareiva's judgment, this must be a great benefit – an improvement for these people over their previous, more precarious subsistence way of life (at least until the mine closes in a few decades). After all, by agreeing to employment with Rio Tinto, they demonstrate their preference for this new way of life.

Or do they? Or are these poor people just selecting from a small set of bad choices – a set that they are powerless to help define? Are these people, in fact, fully autonomous actors in this kind of circumstance? The reader is referred to Lamblin, E.F., et. al., "The causes of land-use and land-cover change: moving beyond the myths", Global Environmental Change, 11 (2001), pp. 261-269, for a start in understanding the economic and sociological naivete of Kareiva's gambit.

9 A final caveat

It concerns a favorite natural capitalist syllogism, which goes:

P1: The alternative to economic value is intrinsic value.
P2: You cannot effectively justify the preservation of nature (or incidentally, of anything else) with intrinsic value.
C: Ergo, if you believe that nature has value, only economic value can properly represent it.

This syllogism seems to be overwhelmingly successful in suppressing the better instincts of those who have not succumbed to the numbing effect of economic training. That is odd, because both its premises are false.

P1 is false because it posits a false dichotomy. It may be that the natural world does have some kind of intrinsic (non-instrumental) value. But it may have many other kinds of value connected with the flourishing of people quite aside from any economic value. It is unfortunate that this possibility never enters public discourse.

It is not clear whether P2 is an empirical claim about whether and how people are persuaded, or the force of modern institutions (whether or not they are good), or a claim about correctness and cogency (because people may not be persuaded by convincing arguments).

Taking these possible interpretations in reverse order: If a claim about correctness and cogency, P2 falls – because it depends on the false presupposition (or conflation) that "effectively" means "effective economic argument". If a claim about the force of modern institutions, P2 does not address the possibility that these institutions may be ineffective in promoting true human flourishing, and perhaps even brutish. If an empirical claim about persuasive efficacy, then it seems that the right experiments have not been made to test P2: Economic arguments have dominated political discourse for decades now. But more important, it would be cynical to promote an economic argument for its persuasive effect on the polis, if we knew or felt deeply that it was incorrect or feeble or largely irrelevant.

This argument might make sense in Toontown. But not in the real world where, I hope, reason still has a chance to prevail.

Read more...

Saturday, April 12, 2008

Those goddamn whales

Whales. Right whales. "Right" whales? Right. Don't make me laugh.

Right whale calf with mother
(Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 2008)
http://www.whoi.edu/
They get to be 60 feet. Hell, I didn't even get to be 6 feet. There I was at 12, playing first 'cause I was the tallest guy on my team. A first baseman! Throws right? Yeah, 'cause I could snag those high throws from our wild-ass third baseman. There I was, all set to shoot up into the stratosphere of manhood. Guess I didn't eat enough of those crusty-aceans or krill or whatever.

Damn those whales for getting to be so big.

And damn 'em 'cause they move so freakin' slow. Freakin' slug-slow. They're goddamn big. And in the goddamn way. 'Cause they're so goddamn big and slow. You know what it's like when you're stuck behind a friggin' semi doin' 45 on a one-lane 70 mph road. Just like that. As if they owned the road. Damn 'em. I pay my taxes for the goddamn road.

And I mean, this "road" we're talkin' about is a goddamn big important highway. Right past those big eastern seaboard ports. Man, we gotta get those big ships in and out. Our economy depends on it. Can't slow that down. Are you kidding? Put good honest people outa work? Raise prices for good, honest, hard-working people like you and me? Why the hell should we take that kind of punch in the gut? For some goddamn, port-blockading whales that are too goddamn slow and stupid to get outa the way?

A blockade! It's a goddamn blockade! Isn't that an act of war? D'ya expect us to take that like some kind of freakin' wimp? Let some goddamn port-choking slug declare war on our economy? Tell me how that's not like letting some kind of goddamn Arab terrorist run all over us. Come on. Tell me. Get outa their way? Go slow for them? Why the hell don't we just nuke 'em?

Get outa their way? Crap, give me a break. No one else is gonna get outa their way. No one else with any kind of sense. So why should we? Tell me. Why should we take the hit? Jeez. Anyone else with any kind of sense is just gonna sit back and laugh up their lunch at us. The free lunch that they got off us for bein' so freakin' stupid.

Get outa their way? What the hell do they do those hunks of blubber do for us? They don't pay any goddamn taxes. But they sure as hell make us pay more. Makin' the goddamn economy go down the goddamn toilet. Don't we have enough problems without having to worry about those goddamn freeloaders? They're not worth a dime. Not a dime. So few of them left, we wouldn't even notice if they all went off to the great whale happy hunting ground. Our economy would be the better for it. No doubt about it.

Ya know, if ya let those goddamn "right" whales get away with it now, they'll really get us "right". Right in the balls, I'd say. Not just with big ships. No. Want to have some fun on the water? Fishing? Just cruisin' around? Even whale-watching? Forget it, sucker. Too many goddamn blubber buses in the way. Get that? Huh? Get it? Can't even have the fun of watchin' the goddamn overgrown tons-of-blubber slugs. 'Cause it would hurt the poor little darlings. Don't make me puke.
Right whale and calf (Richard Ellis, 1980)
RichardEllisPrint


Those goddamn whales. Screw 'em!

Respectfully,
The White House Office of Management and Budget
The Georgia Ports Authority
The US Navy
The World Shipping Council
... and concerned economists everywhere

Dawn, S., "Even the Whales Have Their Predators: Ships", The New York Times, August 12, 2008 (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/us/12whales.html?ref=science)

Read more...

Sunday, February 3, 2008

The mother of all conservation moves

This past week, the Science Times ran this article, "Unnatural Preservation", on how climate change changes the rules of conservation:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/science/earth/29habi.html?ref=science&pagewanted=all

The article portrays the hand-wringing of conservation biologists faced with the confounding factor of a changing climate. Is it, for example, worth trying to save some plant or animal in a preserve where its vulnerability to rising temperatures and its limited ability to find more suitable living conditions will likely make it succumb anyway? Should we, perhaps, sign up United Van Lines to help stage the mother of all moves, to a more hospitable clime, that climate-distressed organisms cannot manage on their own – often because of man-made barriers?

The article's presentation glides silently by two remarkable aspects of this topic. One has to do with accepting the science that motivates the portrayed agonizing over alternative approaches to conservation in the face of a warming climate. The other has to do with the peculiar nature of that agonizing.

First, some brief remarks about the recent history of the scientific premise behind the discussion: Most biologists would expect that many organisms would respond to changes in the temperature (among other factors) with adaptive changes of their own. They see this clearly in the evolution of species throughout geological history. In particular, in times of warming, species have tended to migrate to higher latitudes and to higher elevations. These changes in distribution and relative abundance at a given latitude and elevation are, in turn, bases for finding or confirming the climatic changes that cause them.

Additionally, biologists would expect what they call "phenological shifts". Organisms remaining in increasingly warm conditions would tend to shift their seasonal behavior – doing their "spring thing" (migrating, breeding, nesting, egg laying, flowering, budding) sooner rather than later.

Both the presence of these biological responses and the causal inference from the recent rapid changes in climate have stubbornly resisted universal acceptance – even after the reality of modern climate change became incontrovertible well over a decade ago. The element of controversy is evident in the defensive tone of these Nature papers from 2003, which lay out the case. You may assess it for yourself:

Permesan, C., and Yohe, G., "A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural systems", Nature, 421 (2 January 2003), pp. 37-42 (http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v421/n6918/full/nature01286.html)

Root, T.L., et. al., "Fingerprints of global warming on wild animals and plants", Nature, 421 (2 January 2003), pp. 57-60 (http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v421/n6918/full/nature01333.html or
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/TLRetal-NaturePublished.pdf)

Second, we turn to what may be the even more interesting "adaptive response" of the scientists themselves. The prevailing sentiment expressed by the scientists cited in the article is that a changing climate is a dramatically complicating variable in understanding how we should do conservation. But in the end, it is "just" one more variable. We "just" need to take the effects of climate change into account in managing the world's biogeosphere – moving plants and animals hither and yon, "triaging" the doomed, deciding whether or not to build barrier islands to thwart the terrestrial intrusions of rising seas.

The scientists acknowledge the uncertainty of the effects of climate change (as contrasted with the certainty of its happening), but they seem to regard that uncertainly as yet another biosphere engineering variable, albeit a difficult one. For them, radical uncertainly doesn't change the nature of the problem. The problem remains fundamentally the same, just a bit more difficult, with a few more variables, including some representing uncertainty.

Apparently, for these scientists, the project is to engineer ever more precise and intricate manipulations of ecosystems. No matter that radical uncertainty gives them essentially no hope of knowing what the outcomes will be. No matter that "assisted migration" is essentially the systematic introduction of exotic species, which is known to be a major contributor to the great Pleistocene-Holocene extinction, currently underway and accelerating. Not one cited scientist seems to acknowledge the possibility – or, given the radical uncertainty of outcomes – the likelihood that their manipulations will increase devastation of biota rather than decrease it.

Why do scientists just "stick to the program", despite the apparent madness of it? The reason is easy to grasp. No matter how hard the engineering puzzle, playing engineer is the easy thing to do. It lets us fool ourselves into thinking that we're doing something. And surely, we have to do something.

Yes, something is required of us. But just as surely, to act out of desperation just for the sake of acting – without any legitimate basis for knowing whether we will increase or decrease harm – is tragic foolishness.

It's more than foolish. In a less obvious way, but with high likelihood, an insistent focus on engineering tricks will inevitably increase the harm – by giving us license to avoid considering changes that we really need. Those are changes in the attitudes and behaviors responsible for the harm in the first place. Left unquestioned, the same attitudes and behaviors will ultimately guarantee a situation so irretrievably dire that not even the cleverest or (more apropos) luckiest of interventions could possibly succeed.

The project of critically examining our values contrasts in two ways with the project of ever more arcane feats of engineering. On the one hand, it is a far more difficult thing to get ourselves to do. But on the other hand, the values involved and the attitudes and behaviors they entail are far easier to surmise than the tortured manipulations of conservation biologists.

In fact, at least some values seem to be quite obvious, as do some of the actions that flow from them. Roads are barriers to adaptation. Yet we continue to build (or try to build) them. Shoreline development is a barrier to wetland migration. Yet we continue to do it. Just this past week, the California Coastal Commission considered a proposal to build a road through (not to) a coastal California state park (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/us/06beach.html). The proposed road would have been a barrier in both above-mentioned ways. Fortunately, the Commission saw fit to deny the developers a critical permit. But why would we even seriously consider such a thing? In this case, the goal was simple – to provide more pavement so that more cars can be crammed between San Diego and Los Angeles.

What, we should ask, are the values that lead us to view this kind of road (and many others) as preeminently valuable? In light of what different values would this attitude be viewed as unacceptable and not even worthy of serious consideration?

In all the uncertainty of how biota will react to changes in climate, we may be able to glean one certainty. It is that, so long as we continue to behave as we currently do – aided and abetted by the attitudes and values that now predominate – we will inexorably increase the harm to the natural world, the adaptive capacity of plants and animals will be exceeded, and no engineering trick – no matter how clever – will be able to counteract or compensate for that.

That leaves open the question of how we should behave in the presence of the adaptive plight that we have already inflicted on our fellow creatures. The first, most obvious suggestion is to understand in what ways we have inflicted the harm and to stop inflicting further harm in those ways. If building roads is screwing things up, then we should stop building them. If shoreline development is critically undermining the adaptive capacity of coastline habitats, then for goodness' sake, let's stop it!

The second suggestion seems equally obvious but far more difficult to contemplate – perhaps even unimaginable – without a serious re-evaluation of values. If we have literally built obstacles that seriously constrain and thereby compromise the natural world, then should we not consider removing or moving those obstacles? Why do we consider only moving the natural systems whose adaptive movements and processes we have impounded? Suppose that we convince ourselves of the fantasy of being able to move intact, or at least functioning natural systems hither and yon. With no change in values, shouldn't we expect that "hither and yon" to succumb to the same kind of human incursion? Shouldn't we expect that will happen until neither hither nor yon remains?

Perhaps we should employ United Van Lines for the mother of all moves. But the purpose would not be to move and thereby further decimate the paltry remains of natural systems that we have already fragmented and nearly destroyed. Rather, it would be to move us, or (at least) the fabrications that are instruments of our damaging influence, far enough away to give those systems some breathing space and a fighting chance to survive.

Of course, a full answer to the question of how to help our fellow creatures is not anywhere near that simple, because damaging human influence extends well beyond our most obvious physical artifacts. But the changed values that supports this way of thinking may have some chance of dealing with the complex realities of human alterations of, and damage to natural systems.

Read more...

Friday, January 4, 2008

Aristotle takes up environmental virtue

(The fourth in a series of interviews with the great philosopher)

[In his previous appearance, "Aristotle takes a closer look at natural capital" (http://environmentalvalues.blogspot.com/2007/11/aristotle-returns-to-take-closer-look.html), Aristotle promised to suggest an alternative to natural capitalism for valuing nature. He returns to begin to make good on that promise.]

H: Good day, Mr. A. We understand that you've been reflecting about environmental values for quite a few days.

A: With great intensity.

H: That's easy to believe. You've certainly shown us how vexingly difficult this subject is.

A: I don't think that I've ever given my armchair a tougher workout.

H: None of that new new experimental philosophy stuff (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/magazine/09wwln-idealab-t.html) for you, huh?

A: Indeed not. It's not until one's posterior has found its proper resting place that one's mind can, too.

H: "Posterior Analytics", so to speak?
An Old Man in an Armchair
(Follower of Rembrandt van Rijn, late 17th c.)

A: Hah! One of my better efforts, wouldn't you say? But that work is all about demonstration and syllogism — the kind of thing that the chunking, counting, and computing econo-consequentialists like to do. As we've seen, "demonstrating" moral value by a theory that calculates it from first principles is not the right tool for the job of weighing the many complex and conflicting interests and demands on our moral attention. The econo-consequentialists produce moral non-sense with those tools. At least, that may give us the sense that that kind of neatly packaged theoretical guide to ethics is a chimera.

H: But surely, we can't ignore science. All the earth sciences, the biology of all of earth's creatures, and particularly ecology tell us so much about the natural world. How can our values float free from all this theoretical knowledge?

A: Hey, man, everyone focuses so much on my physics, astronomy, and cosmology that they forget how much sweat I put into my biological studies. I was pretty much the first one to do biology systematically and empirically. And I didn't just look at humans like those Hippocratic medical dudes. I looked at all kinds of creatures — animals and even plants: anatomy, physiology, reproductive behavior, embryology, systematics. Check out my piece on hectocotylization in cuttlefish in "The History of Animals" (IV.2 http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/history_anim.4.iv.html and V.6 http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/history_anim.5.v.html). That wasn't just damn good for its day. It took until 1959 for modern biology to catch up to it!

H: Yeah, you really are the guy with the theory of everything.

A: You bet. That's because science informs philosophy and vice versa. There's no separating the two. And science is particularly critical in understanding environmental values — perhaps more so than in any other realm of moral valuation. But it must be used properly.

H: How, if not by measuring value, or by calculating it — like those econo-consequentialists who sum and subtract utilities...

A: ... or the ones who find marginal utility at the intersection of cost and benefit curves? No, not that way. To understand the proper role of science in informing our understanding of environmental values, one must understand two dimensions of ethical evaluation.

H: Which are?

A: As I've written,
the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.

Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics", Bk. VI.12, tr. W.D. Ross
(http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.6.vi.html)

H: Virtue and practical reasoning?

A: Exactly. In practice, neither is prior to the other, though our explanation must consider them in sequence. Let's do that for environmental values.

H: Ok, shoot.

A: First we determine what kinds of environmental virtues or excellences are essential for, indeed constitute human well-being. We ask ourselves, "What kind of person do I want to be — should I be — insofar as I am that kind of animal that I am, a human animal with a rational soul, operating in a natural world? What kinds of attitudes and habitual ways of acting should I develop — to the point that I adopt and practice them with an ease devoid of any felt resistance, reluctance, or burden — that conduce to my flourishing in the environments in which I find myself?"

H: And the other, "practical reasoning" part?

A: That's what I call "phronesis".

H: Phronesis?

A: Yes. The wisdom that guides us in finding the specific actions for our specific circumstances in a way that improves our well being. As a result of this kind of practical deliberation, we develop attitudes and habits that are a starting point for further deliberative action. But attitudes and habitual behavior alone never suffice or ensure continued well being. We are never anointed "excellent" in this way or that, whereupon we flourish forever after.

H: I suppose you might say that such a person would have succumbed to the vice of sloth, or at least, laziness. I guess that it's no different for environmental virtues.

A: Not different at all. In matters environmental, we never stop needing phronesis to find how best to continue to develop and express our various environmental excellences in balance with themselves, as well as in balance with other excellences that are characteristic of those who live well. Don't forget friendship, for example (remember what we said in our first session (http://environmentalvalues.blogspot.com/2007/08/interview-with-aristotle.html)?; and there are many other virtues, as I discuss in my "Nichomachean Ethics".

H: But you make it sound as though phronesis is just another virtue.

A: A virtue is precisely what it is! But not "just another" one. Phronesis is, in fact, the intellectual virtue that enables us to deliberate and find those acts that express, in a balanced way, the many excellences or virtues that are part of living well.

H: So let's get back to the role of science in this.

A: Well, if there are two dimensions to moral evaluation, then one might think that there are two possible ways to apply scientific or theoretical knowledge to it.

H: Are there?

A: Perhaps there is some role for science in phronesis. But I believe that the overwhelmingly dominant role of science in environmental morals is to help us understand various kinds of environmental virtue and their characteristics — not in precisely defining an algorithm for the deliberative processes that we use to arrive at decisions about how best to act in a particular case.

H: Don't the econo-consequentialists have it backwards?

A: I think so. They maintain that we have a phronetic algorithm. We arrive at the right act by deducing it from first principles of economic science — perhaps the principle of maximizing welfare, or perhaps the principle of efficiency, or perhaps some other, similar principle. For them, that is the sum total of deliberation— a stick figure version of phronesis, at best. One can view the econo-consequentialist's mistaken supposition about how science informs moral values to be the root cause of their distorted and contorted results.

H: That's a really helpful insight. But then, how does science help us define environmental virtues?

A: That, my friend, is an ideal place from which to launch a general enquiry into the nature of environmental virtues.

H: Why is that, Mr. A?

A: We don't really need science to understand how our flourishing is interlocked with the flourishing of our friendships and the people that we befriend.

H: I suppose not.

A: And so it is with the other virtues that I discuss in my "Nichomachean Ethics". It's even true that many environmental virtues are variations on virtue themes that I explored in my "Nichomachean Ethics".

H: I guess that shouldn't be surprising.

A: Still, some of the most important environmental virtues and their salient characteristics cannot be well understood — their huge moral significance cannot be appreciated — without the help of the sciences that show how our flourishing is interlocked with the flourishing of the natural world. The twin sciences of ecology and evolution are particularly important. In fact, for some environmental virtues, the tie to ecology is so strong that we might call these "ecological virtues" — with the caveat that we understand this as a reference to how we come to realize the nature of this category of environmental virtues, not a reference to how one should be an excellent ecologist.

H: Ok, so let's start with some of those ecological virtues.

A: Consider first our place in the history of the planet earth, only home we have — our connection as a species to the past extending back before H. sapiens existed, and extending out to the future beyond the time when H. sapiens goes extinct.

H: Science certainly shows us that no species is a permanent fixture on our planet.

A: I have it from good sources (Dirzo, R., Raven, P., "Global state of biodiversity and loss", Annual Review of Environment and Natural Resources, 28 (2003), pp. 137-167) that the average lifetime of a species is between 5 - 10 million years. Mammals stick around for up to 13 million years. So let's be outlandishly generous to ourselves and give H. sapiens an unprecedented 20 million years. Even if we acknowledge archaic varieties of H. sapiens that might have emerged 300,000 or more years ago, or take the starting point to be that of the genus Homo (of which we are are the sole surviving species) as much as 2.4 million years ago, let's suppose that we have a good long run ahead.

H: But not forever.

A: Not forever. Our species came upon the scene sometime in the very recent geological past. There is no scientific reason not to expect that it will exit the scene sometime later, if not sooner, in the very near geological future. We are extraordinarily adaptable, but not infinitely so.

H: I suppose that we would have had a tough time dealing with the methane-rich atmosphere of geological times past...

A: ... as one example.

H: So what does that mean for environmental value?

A: With this relatively new knowledge of our species' place in earth history comes our understanding of our connection to our ancestors — the creatures from which we evolved and from whom we inherited the kind of place, or really, places (for it changes constantly), that the earth was for them at various times through prehistory. It gives us a sense that we, too, may be ancestor for some one or more species that descend from us. And, even if we are to be the last species of the genus Homo, then it still gives us a sense of ourselves as ancestral keeper of the the place that will be home for whatever species survive our departure.

H: So, if I may paraphrase: Science teaches us that we have a biological and geophysical heritage; and that we shall leave a similar legacy — even if there is eventually no species to propagate the human genome or whatever genome that evolution transforms it into.

A: A quick study you are. And this understanding of geological and species history suggests our first environmental virtue — a certain, scientifically informed sense of honor — for the creatures and places that engendered us, for our human ancestors who, whether consciously or unwittingly, left enough intact for us moderns to connect to more ancient times, for the fellow creatures that made it with us to this point of geological time, for human descendants who deserve to make the same connections and whose ability to do so depends on our behavior, and finally, to our descendants and the kind of place they will inherit and inhabit.

H: What kinds of places do you have in mind?

A: Think of places like the canyonlands of the Colorado Plateau. They are a storehouse of the history of creative forces pre-dating the Cambrian explosion of fauna around 530 million years ago, at the very start of the Proterozoic Eon. A place like that connects us to the forces that resulted in who we are, where we are.

H: I didn't know that you've had a chance to make it out there.

A: There's only so much wear and tear that my armchair can take over 2300 years, you know.

H: You sure don't hear economists talk about anything like that.

A: The value of our natural heritage is horribly distorted when viewed as a neatly chunked and counted stockpile of goods in a warehouse right now. Rather, it is, in part, the value of something — a planet and the creatures that inhabit it — with a history that is responsible for our genesis, and with a history that, if we demonstrate this kind of environmental excellence, will engender creatures beyond the end of human history.

H: You said something about our fellow creatures. Would you say something more about them?

A: Yes. In fact, I would propose a second environmental virtue that focuses on them.

H: What would that be?

A: A sense of honor, but also sympathy for fellow organisms that coevolved with us and that now share our home. Once again, our science is indispensable in understanding the degree to which they share with us a common genetic heritage, and with that, similar needs, drives, desires, and limitations. The conservation of genes among creatures that appear wildly different to human sensibility makes this impossible to ignore. Perhaps it's not too surprising that only 1.6% of human and chimp genes differ, though almost all genes in each species has a counterpart in the other. It may be more surprising that, despite 75 million years of separate evolution, only about 300 genes — less than 1% of the 30,000 possessed by mouse — have no obvious counterpart in the human genome (The Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium, "Initial sequencing and comparative analysis of the mouse genome", Nature, 420 (5 December 2002), p. 521, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v420/n6915/full/nature01262.html).

H: Holy mole.

A: No, mouse. But it's probably not much different for moles. And that shouldn't surprise. Mouse and human both must have what it takes to be a terrestrial mammalian vertebrate on this particular planet. Or, as a computational biologist would put it, the conservation of genes reflects functional constraints on the existence of a terrestrial mammal (Thomas, J.W., et. al., "Comparative analyses of multi-species sequences from targeted genomic regions", Nature, 424 (14 August 2003), pp. 788-793, http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v424/n6950/full/nature01858.html) If we go to D. malanogaster, the common fruit fly, we still find only 40% of its genes differ from human's. But that much similarity is part of what it is to be a terrestrial animal of any kind on this planet. To focus on the differences in our fellow creatures and to view as limitations differences from humans, is to ignorantly overlook our own.

H: Wow, Mr. A. You've really must have been boning up on science in the last 2.3 millennia.

A: Remember, I was already doing some damn good work in my day.

H: Yeah, I remember that cuttlefish work. it's a shame you couldn't have gotten that published in "Nature".

A: Now that would be something — seeing my work right alongside the stuff by Constanza, Pimm, and those natural capitalists. Hey, speaking of the devil, did you hear Constanza honking his natural capital panpipes on NPR's "Marketplace" last Wednesday (http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/01/02/natural_resources_value/)? Why don't those NPR troglodytes put me on with him?

H: Maybe they don't find many people in their target audience who speak ancient Greek. But we'd be happy to lend them our babelfish translator.

A: No matter — especially since recent science is generally changing our perspective on our place in the natural world. And the changes in perspective demand changes in how we view our moral character as actors in it.

H: So you're saying that, in a certain sense, our understanding of our moral character keeps pace with our scientific understanding?

A: Yes! For example, think of the pre-human state of New Zealand where, in the complete absence of terrestrial mammals (except for two herbivorous fruit bats), flightless, ground-nesting birds flourished. When the Maori's colonized the islands, they introduced mammalian predators, such as dogs and Polynesian rats (which are known to enjoy scrambled eggs and a hatchling or two for breakfast); they appropriated the habitats of these animals; and they themselves hunted them intensively. According to Rodolfo Dirzo and Peter Raven,
The colonization by humans of the Pacific Islands eastward and northeastward from southern Asia resulted in the elimination of some 1000 species of birds over a period of about 1000 years in this area alone—about a tenth of the world total that existed before the Polynesian colonizing voyages took place. Studies of these islands suggest that about half the species present when humans arrived have been preserved as fossils and that they and about an equal number of unknown species were lost as a result of human activities.

Dirzo, R., Raven, P., "Global state of biodiversity and loss", Annual Review of Environment and Natural Resources, 28 (2003), p. 153

H: They were incredibly destructive! What does that say about their moral character?

A: They could not have understood the moral significance of their behavior in the way that science now enables us to do. Given their innocence, we cannot assess their character in the same way that we do ours.

H: So there's a kind of co-evolution of scientific understanding with our understanding of human excellence...

A: ... and a co-evolution of how we assess a person's moral character. But I think it undeniable that science now demonstrates our close connection with other living things. And this allows us to see the lack of excellence in the character of a person who nowadays would casually and even ignorantly behave in ways that help sustain the 6th and possibly most devastating of the great mass extinctions in the 545 million years of the Phanerozoic Eon. Surely, honor and sympathy for other creatures is an environmental excellence that requires of a person that she find ways of living that avoid helping to destroy the legacy of creative forces that tie our existence to theirs.

H: What does that imply for our behavior?

A: At this point, there's are no major mysteries about how we impinge on the well being of other creatures. We appropriate all the land for our own, species-narrow purposes. We change the climate beyond the adaptive capacities of other creatures. We introduce alien animals and plants into biomes in which they did not evolve, and which are subsequently simplified and degraded. We introduce unprecedented amounts of nitrogen into habitats as airborne industrial pollutants and as agricultural runoff that change completely how many ecosystems work — to the detriment of many organisms who thrive on their efficient use of nitrogen. And we spew unprecedented amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere. Aside from the effect on climate, this wreaks havoc in habitats in which plants use different metabolic pathways with differing efficiencies, to assimilate that gas. (Sala, O.E., et. al., "Global Biodiversity Scenarios for the Year 2100", Science, 287 (10 March 2000), pp. 1770-1774, http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/287/5459/1770)

H: Ok, I get it. So there we have a second environmental virtue rooted in science.

A: Yes, "rooted" is a good way to put it. Our recognition of these kinds of environmental virtues is not dictated by, or deduced from science. Rather, the science provides a deeper, richer, more interconnected picture of the world that's tied to its past as well as to its future. How we act, on a stage so transformed, is not surprisingly transformed in moral significance. On this stage, previously hidden parts of our moral character are revealed.

H: You've identified two ecological virtues, so far, Mr. A. Are there any more environmental virtues that you'd call "ecological virtues"?

A: There are. Consider how recent science has given us a newfound appreciation of natural systems as comprising an impenetrably complex sustainer of all life, including human life. It runs according to an inextricably entangled and complexly interacting web of rules that play out over time spans that range from the near-instantaneous to geological. This is not some kind of pre-scientific obeisance, but a knowing acknowledgment. That acknowledgment helps us recognize some more environmental virtues, including perhaps some of the most critical ones.

H: What would they be?

A: I would liken the rules by which earth's natural systems operate to a kind of constitution for all that exists on earth. Like a constitution, it is a foundational framework with subtly counteracting forces. But this one is prior to all other frameworks — including political constitutions — because only it is only within it that everything constitutive of any life, let alone a flourishing human life, is possible.

H: So what should we make out of that?

A: Let's consider how we regard our political constitutions.

H: Ok.

A: Pop quiz.

H: Oh no! I thought I was doing ethics, not political science.

A: A completely arbitrary distinction, in my judgment.

H: You didn't pop quizzes on your students at the Lyceum, did you?

A: Heraclitus in Hades, yes. It's a long-standing academic tradition that I see is alive and well at Stanford. But don't worry. I'll give you a big hint for answering my question.

H: Ok, shoot.

A: In what salient respect do constitutions of state mimic some important basic properties of natural systems that we've just mentioned?

H: Hint please?

A: History! Connections! Continuity (not sameness) with the past and future! We've shown how static inventories don't properly capture environmental value. What is a preeminent historical significance of a constitution?

H: Well, at least a successful and long-lived one would embody a kind of political or cultural wisdom that binds us to persons in our society that preceded us, and to those who will come after.

A: Excellent! A constitution is the time-spanning connective tissue of a society. In part, a state's constitution defines the rules of change for a society in a way that permits it to adapt and change itself without damaging or necessarily changing the very rules that make it possible. Speaking of Heraclitus, I have my differences with that crazy dude. But he'd be pretty sympathetic with this notion of a political order. He saw human society as a cosmos like the natural cosmos, with its underlying order reflected in its laws.

H: Ok, I think that I can buy that.

A: In fact, I would say the the very identity of a state is bound up in its constitution:
since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters; for example, a scale containing the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and it may be called or not called by the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another question, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfill engagements when the form of government changes.

Aristotle, "Politics", III.3, tr. Benjamin Jowett
(http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three.html)

H: So really, you can't change a state's constitution without changing, or really destroying that particular state.

A: Of course, for a state, there's the possibility of creating and adopting a new constitution after abandoning or significantly altering the current one.

H: But that sounds pretty risky, doesn't it?

A: Emphatically agreed. Suppose that a constitution promotes the flourishing of its citizens through its articles. Suppose that those articles effect a delicate balance of positive and negative feedback for its citizens that guides them to behave in ways that conduce to their individual and mutual well being. Then it would be risky, indeed, to alter that balance. It is difficult, if not impossible, to calculate how a change in one article or another will change the point of balance.

H: And a lot is at stake.

A: The entire state and all its citizens. But not just now; and not just the well being of a single citizen.

H: I suppose that's why successful constitutions contain provisions that make it very difficult to change them.

A: That is so. And much the same is true of the "constitution" of the natural world. One cannot cherry pick the "articles" that presently seem convenient to keep in place while ignoring ones that may lately appear somewhat inconvenient.

H: Aren't there differences between the constitution of a state and the "constitution" of the natural world?

A: Of course: The framework and fabric of the natural world is not a contract in the social sense, not a human construct of any kind. It is there before our very eyes, though sometimes only immediately evident to our best scientific experts — as embodied in the various creatures and their habitats, as they have come through the last 4.5 billion years. And of course, violations are subject to the rule of natural, not human law. But insofar as it is a vital framework for our well-being, insofar as it is a framework that unites us with all that came before us and all that will follow, insofar as it is a framework that has created the only kind of home that we humans have ever known, insofar as it is evidently an arrangement of delicate balance that is easily upset — we owe it the care and respect that we owe to socially constitutive frameworks. That ecological wisdom and the respect it should engender is, I would say, a third ecological virtue.

H: Boy, that's a lot different from thinking of the natural world as a resource for getting all the stuff that we want at the lowest possible cost.

A: I would say, a world apart. In fact, our third environmental virtue has several corollary virtues that may further distinguish our approach.

H: What do you have in mind?

A: I would suggest that the kind of wisdom and respect we've just discussed has also a certain elements of courage, restraint, and humility.

H: How do you mean?

A: The natural creativity that we've been discussing is something mostly outside of human control. In our environmental wisdom, we know that it is inimitable. It is far to complex and impenetrable to imitate, let alone to duplicate or to substitute for. As we have observed, while it created the human species, it almost certainly will also destroy it.

H: That's pretty scary.

A: It's extremely scary. I would say that it takes tremendous courage to understand this, and yet strive to keep these natural creative forces alive and healthy in the earth's ecosystems.

H: Even though we also know that, in fact, we flourish in this advocacy.

A: Even so. I would identify this kind of courage as a fourth environmental virtue.

H: I would have thought of that as a kind of restraint.

A: I think that's involved, too. We can intervene at will and pretend to substitute our creative abilities for those of natural systems, and we have often done so. There is perhaps a temptation to exercise our power just because we have it. But we should know that our creative abilities cannot really substitute for natural creativity which, since it does not originate with a single (human) creature, reflects far more complexity and diversity. And so a fifth virtue is that of restraint from this kind of careless exercise.

H: But I would think that understanding of our limits also implies a kind of humility.

A: Exactly where I was heading. As we've observed, our scientific understanding of natural systems has sufficient power to make us realize that some aspects of our behavior, as it affects the natural world, have moral significance. At the same time, we should have the humility to acknowledge that science does not thereby become a measure of value.

H: That's kind of similar to the mistake that the econo-consequentialists make.

A: Very much so. But also — and this is really a separate point — we need to admit how puny — in fact, and perhaps even in principle — our scientific knowledge is when it comes understanding causes and effects in complex ecosystems in a way that permits us to reliably predict the outcomes of our intrusions. Ironically, it seems that our finest scientists are often the worst offenders in advocating interventions with a gross absence of this kind of humility.

H: I guess a lot of our blog has been devoted to pointing that out. Remember our account of introducing the cactus moth to control unwanted prickly pear cactus in the the prickly pear's native Caribbean habitats (http://environmentalvalues.blogspot.com/2007/10/managing-baseball-managing-nature.html)?

A: Ah yes. It seems that the Mexican poor are about to pay a heavy price for that bit of arrogance. Unfortunately, it's not an isolated case. Think of the half-century long policy to eliminate predators — "bad" animals — wolves, bears, mountain lions — that prey on "good" ones — deer, for example. (A.S. Leopold, et. al., "Wildlife Management in the National Parks", in U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Administrative Policies for Natural Areas of the National Park System (Washington, D.C., 1968); also National Parks Magazine, 37 (1963)). We now see through that analysis — even laugh at the fact that we were expressing an "arbitrary", though really, anthropocentrically self-serving preference to remove the natural predators — so that we humans, qua hunters, could replace them. But in truth, we know of few interventions that are better justified.

H: I'm afraid that there's a pretty long list.

A: Evidence the implementation of the Endangered Species Act. We selectively embrace what feels good to us. Small non-furry creatures such as frogs and spiders don't feel so good; they have little support. Big furry creatures fare better. Plants? The primary producers of our planet? If they produce pretty flowers, they might get noticed. Otherwise, they're nearly forgotten.

H: Yeah, it's pretty embarrassing. I guess that for critters, we act to keep something only if it looks good in the zoo, as a stuffed animal, or on our plates.

A: You might think that ecologists do better when they discuss this sort of thing in their scientific journals.

H: Don't they?

A: Think of the discussion of how to target our efforts to save the organisms that inhabit the earth. We read that biodiversity is the key.

H: Gee, isn't it?

A: Why should we think so? There isn't even any single definition of "biodiversity". Depending on her purpose an ecologist may have in mind any one or more of multiple characterizations — genetic, intraspecies diversity; or the diversity of species; or the diversity of functional groups; or concentrations of endemisms. (Dirzo, R., Raven, P., "Global state of biodiversity and loss", Annual Review of Environment and Natural Resources, 28 (2003), pp. 138-139)

H: I hadn't thought of that.

A: Should we save the hotspots of endemism on the grounds that those contain the most kinds of endangered species in the least amount of area — 1.4% of the earth's land surface? What about the "coldspots" in the other 98.4% of the land that may provide global and local ecosystem processes that natural capitalists would consider important; or that contain unique evolutionary lineages and rare species; or that encompass the last major wilderness landscapes; or that provide habitat for wide-ranging animal species? (Kareiva, P. and Marview, M., "Conserving Biodiversity Coldspots", American Scientist, 91 (July-August 2003), pp. 344-351, http://www.scu.edu/cas/biology/staffandfaculty/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=32625). Are some species just plain dispensable? Many conservation biologists say that. "We wouldn't even notice when this little caddisfly vanishes in Glacier Nation Park..."

H: Gee, I don't know about that.

A: Neither do I. For one thing, we may not notice the absence of an organism — at least, not right away — only because of the limitations in our science, or in the time span in which we can make observations, or in the conditions that happen to obtain in that limited time span. We may never get to observe the conditions in which a creature's now vacated role becomes obvious, even paramount. But more fundamentally, what possible justification do we have for adopting any one or more of those biodiversity criteria for intervening on behalf of some species, or for casually declaring the death sentence for others? On what grounds can we claim that our choice in any of these cases is any less arbitrary, or self-serving, or based on less narrowly construed human preferences than the now-abandoned dictum to eliminate predators?

H: But surely it would be better to choose one than none, better to save some rather than to lose all.

A: Because the species we choose to save has a "scientific" justification for its continued existence?

H: Ah, yes. That's something that The Nature Conservancy scientist, Sanjayan, would say, as helioskiagrablog discussed last month (http://environmentalvalues.blogspot.com/2007/12/environmental-values-science-and-nature.html).

A: As you intimated in that piece, that's surely an ethically empty criterion — no different from the one that justified the predator elimination program that we now disavow. But even more profoundly, I would also suggest that the kind of choices you feel compelled to make — grasping for this species here, that other one there — are choices of a desperate triage whose ultimate failure is almost certainly guaranteed. The conditions that make the triage compelling now will make it ever more desperate. No matter how careful our choices are, we really never completely understand their full effects. And in any event, we will at some point be reduced to choices that plainly consummate the evisceration of what little we have left of natural ecosystems. Unless we begin to question the assumptions that seem to necessitate this losing struggle. I think that worthy of its own separate discussion on another occasion.

H: We may take you up on that. But in any case, I think that you've convinced us that humility, perhaps a kind of scientific humility is an environmental virtue.

A: Well put. I would say that our sixth environmental virtue is the humility to admit first, that it is a category mistake to think that science is a measuring stick for natural value. And second, we should have the humility to acknowledge that it is, as a matter of fact, too puny for measuring the "importance" of parts even if that importance is narrowly defined in terms of what we humans desire or prefer to keep with us. Certainly, our track record in satisfying those preferences, however justified (or not), is abominable. We simply do not have any kind of reliable handle on either the resilience or vulnerabilities of the natural systems that we seem unable to resist meddling with.

H: Wow, Mr. A. We've covered a whole lot of territory today.

A: I'd say so. Six virtues in one day. That's kind of like a virtue marathon — maybe even an all-time record.

H: Could be.

A: And yet, there's much more to do.

H: I kind of thought so. More environmental virtues?

A: More of those. But also, I'd like to share some thoughts on what virtue ethics is, and what it's not; and to defend it against some common, but misguided criticisms.

H: That would certainly be helpful, Mr. A.

A: Also, I'd like to get back to why your triage conundrum is a false one.

H: Excellent. Anything else?

A: How about a look at the last man example?

H: You mean Richard Sylvan's thought experiment? And the last people example, too?

A: I think that would be illuminating.

H: Hey, Mr. A, there's no greater luminary than you to discuss stuff like this.

A: I do my best. But I think that it's time to dive back into my armchair. There's a lot to contemplate for next time.

H: Thank you, Mr. A. And we'll see what we can do about getting you a spot on NPR.

A: Hey, d'ya think you could get a theme song for me played on a barbitos? Alcaeus and Sappho had some hot tunes for that instrument, ya know. Still popular around Lesbos when I was tramping around there doing my field work with Theophrastus.

H: Your biologist buddy?

A: Yeah, I loved that guy — even though he believed that eating meat is unjust on the grounds that it robs non-human animals of life. Seemed strange at the time; but after 2.3 millennia, maybe that's worth another look. My armchair awaits...

H: Ok, helioskiagrablog readers. There you have some of Aristotle's first thoughts ever on environmental virtues. And there's more to come.

Read more...